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HERE ARE significant differences between investigations
of military aircraft accidents conducted by the military
and civil aircraft investigations conducted by the National
Transporation Safety Board.' These differences in investiga-
tion procedure lead not only to differences in the nature of
the information that is developed and available to civil liti-
gants, but also to differences in the way parties should go
about obtaining that information. This article will first ex-
amine the nature of the military aircraft accident investiga-
tion process and the type of information it produces. Next,
the case law dealing with the use of such information in pri-
vate civil litigation will be reviewed. Finally, specific prob-
lem areas with regard to the use of such information will be
discussed in detail.
II. THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PROCESS
The principle flying Armed Services-the Air Force and
the Navy-use two-track procedures for investigating mili-
* A.B., 1968, Cornell; J.D., 1972, Columbia; Member of Massachusetts and Wash-
ington State Bars; Admitted to practice in various federal circuits and districts; Mem-
ber, ABA Section on Tort and Insurance Practice; Partner, Perkins, Coic, Stone, Olsen
& Williams, Seattle, Washington.
I For a discussion of accident investigation procedures used by the National Trans-
portation Safety Board, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 880-835, 845 (1983). See also Miller, Aircraft
Accident Investigation: Functions and Legal Perspectives, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 237 (1981).
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tary aircraft accidents. These consist of (1) a largely confi-
dential investigation conducted exclusively in the interest of
aviation safety,2 and (2) a privately conducted but publicly
obtainable investigation conducted "to preserve available ev-
idence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, ad-
ministrative proceedings, and other purposes."' Since Air
Force and Navy procedures are largely parallel in this area,
this section will focus on Air Force procedures by way of ex-
ample. In the Air Force, the first investigation is called the
"Safety Mishap Investigation."4 The second investigation is
known as the "Aircraft Accident Investigation."5
A. The Safety Mishap Investigation
The Safety Mishap Investigation of a major aircraft acci-
See infra text accompanying notes 6-16.
See infta text accompanying notes 18-23.
See Air Force Reg. 127-4. See Appendix A for the pertinent text of Air Force Reg.
127-4. The naval counterpart of the Air Force Aircraft Safety Mishap Report is the
Aircraft Mishap Investigation Report conducted pursuant to the Naval Aviation
Safety Program, OPNAV Instruction 3750.6N (April 26, 1984).
1 See Air Force Reg. 110-14. See Appendix B for pertinent text of Air Force Reg.
110-14. The navy counterpart of the Air Force's Aircraft Accident Investigation, gen-
erally limited to "non-mishap" occurrences, is the Aircraft Hazard Investigation, con-
ducted pursuant to the Naval Aviation Safety Program, OPNAV Instruction 3750.6N,
supra note 4. A "Naval Aircraft Mishap" is defined as
404 NAVAL AIRCRAFT MISHAP DEFINED
a. A naval aircraft mishap is an unplanned event or series of events,
directly involving naval aircraft which result in any of the following:
(1) Ten thousand Dollars or greater cumulative damage to naval
aircraft, other aircraft (DOD or non-DOD), and property (DOD or non-
DOD). Property damage includes costs to repair or replace facilities,
equipment or material.
(2) An injury as defined in paragraph 407.
407 INJURY DEFINED
a. Traumatic bodily harm received while involved with naval aircraft,
such as a cut, fracture, burns, or poisoning, resulting from a single or one
day exposure to an external force, toxic substance, or physical agent,
which results in:
(1) Fatality, regardless of the time between injury and death.
(2) Permanent total disability.
(3) Permanent partial disability.
(4) One or more lost workdays (not including the day of injury).
b. Consider only the following injuries in determining the severity clas-
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dent is conducted by a board of Air Force officers appointed
by the major command with responsibility for the aircraft. 6
These are not specialists in investigating accidents, although
under current procedures one member is from the Aerospace
Safety Center at Norton Air Force Base. Generally, the
board uses technical advisors from the Air Force Logistics
Command at Tinker Air Force Base. Assistance from the
prime contractor is frequently requested and obtained. By
regulation, the sole purpose of this investigation is to find the
cause of the accident to "prevent mishap recurrence." 7
The safety investigation begins immediately after the acci-
dent and is generally complete within a few weeks. Most in-
vestigations are conducted along fairly standard lines and
include examining the wreckage and aircraft maintenance
records, personnel records and medical records; interviewing
witnesses; preparing wreckage scatter and flight path dia-
grams, if feasible and pertinent; conducting teardowns of
components whose functioning is suspect; documenting the
positions of switches, instruments, and valves; and listening to
the air traffic control tapes and obtaining transcripts and ob-
taining appropriate technical evaluations from the
contractor.8
When completed the report consists of fill-in-the-blanks-
type forms9 calling for a narrative description of findings,
conclusions and recommendations. "Group reports" con-
cerning various aircraft systems, and evaluations by contrac-
sification in any given naval aircraft mishap (refer to paragraph 415 for
injury costing).
(1) All injuries to active duty, on or off duty, DOD military person-
nel (including reservists).
(2) All injuries to on duty DOD civilian personnel, including foreign
nationals attached to the DOD.
(3) Fatal injuires to off duty DOD civilian personnel, off duty for-
eign nationals attached to the DOD, and non-DOD civilian personnel.
Naval Aviation Safety Program, OPNAV Instruction 3750.6N, at 4-3 to 4-6.
11 Air Force Reg. 127-4, Ch. 3, 3-4.
7 Air Force Reg. 127-4, Ch. 1, 1-9.
Air Force Reg. 127-4, Ch. 3, 3-5 - 3-10.
SeeAir Force Form 711 ("USAF Mishap Report") and Air Force Form 71 lb ("Air-
craft Flight Mishap Report"), the preparation of which are described in Air Force Reg.
127-4, Ch. 12.
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tors and witness statements are attached. A transcript is also
made of the Board's deliberations. 1°
The Safety Board has no authority to subpoena or swear
witnesses, either military or civilian. Witnesses who do give
statements are given an assurance that their statements will
be kept confidential and used only for accident prevention
purposes." The premise for this procedure is that witnesses
will be more candid if they know their statements cannot
later be used against them. The same premise applies to
technical evaluations and other information obtained from
civilian contractors. 12
The Air Force takes the position that major portions of the
information and report developed during the safety investiga-
tion are privileged from disclosure. 3 This includes not only
the opinions, conclusions and recommendations of the inves-
tigating board but also other subjects including witness state-
ments from military and non-military witnesses and technical
reports submitted by contractors in support of the investiga-
tion. According to the regulations, these materials are to be
placed in Part II of the Report. 4 Part I contains factual ma-
terial which is generally releasable.' 5 The Air Force also
takes the position that all work done by contractors in sup-
port of the safety investigation is privileged, including, for ex-
ample, data developed by the contractor in response to an
oral request and which does not result in the contractor sup-
plying a written report.'6 It also seems to be the position of
the Air Force that this privilege belongs to the Government
and cannot be waived by the contractor without the consent
of the Air Force. 17
Id
Air Force Reg. 127-4, Ch. 3, 3-5d.
' Air Force Reg. 110-14, 2 at 1-2.
Id.
" Air Force Reg. 127-4, Ch. 12.
Id.
Id
'7 See infra text accompanying notes 24-58, 19.
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B. The Aircraft Accident Investigation
The Aircraft Accident Investigation is conducted by an of-
ficer appointed for that purpose. 8 The officer in charge of
the Air Force Regulation 110-14 investigation is given access
to the wreckage, Part I of the Safety Mishap Report, and the
names of witnesses (but not the substance of their statements
to the Safety Mishap Board).' 9
There was a time when the Air Force took the position that
portions of the Aircraft Accident Report20 were privileged
from disclosure.2 ' These portions included opinions, analyses,
speculations and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident
Board.2 2 The current position of the Air Force is that Air-
craft Accident Reports are releasable, but that the opinions,
conclusions and recommendations of the investigator must
not be included in the report.2 3
III. HISTORY OF LITIGATION INVOLVING MILITARY
ACCIDENT REPORTS
The seminal case in the area is Machin v. Zuckert,24 decided
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1963.
Machin involved a subpoena issued to the Secretary of the Air
Force to produce an accident investigation report for use in
litigation to which the United States was not a party.2 5 The
court refused to order the production of "testimony of private
parties," "any conclusions that might be based in any fashion
on such privileged information," and "any portions of the re-
port reflecting Air Force deliberations or recommendations as
See Air Force Reg. 110-14.
''Id
o The Accident Board Report was previously called the "Collateral Report" and is
sometimes still referred to as such.
21 Ste generally text accompanying notes 24-60.
22 See Air Force Reg. 110-14.
-2 Id.
24 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963). An earlier case, U.S v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), was decided on the basis that the report was classified in
the interest of national security. The armed services no longer take the position that
their reports are classified documents so the utility of the Reynolds reasoning denying
disclosure is limited.
2r Machin, 316 F.2d at 337.
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to policies that should be pursued. '26 On the other hand, the
court held that the "factual findings of the Air Force mechan-
ics who examined the wreckage" should be released, includ-
ing "any 'opinions' or 'conclusions' as to possible defects.
27
The court ordered an in camera inspection of the mechanics'
reports to determine what should be released. 28
The next case of significance involving military aviation
accident reports was O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.21 O'Keefe was de-
cided in 1965 by the District Court of the Southern District of
New York and involved the efforts of the plaintiffs to obtain
portions of four investigation reports3 ° which had found their
way into the hands of the contractor.3 The portions the
plaintiff sought included witness statements, group reports
and the formal report.3 2 The United States intervened in or-
der to assert a claim of privilege.3 3 The court sustained the
privilege as to "opinions, speculations, recommendations or
discussions of Air Force policy" contained within the docu-
ments but denied the privilege as to "records of facts."'34 It is
unclear whether the decision to require limited disclosure was
based upon the absence of a privilege for the material whose
disclosure was ordered or upon waiver of the privilege by giv-
ing the material to the contractor.
Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 35 decided in 1973 by the
same court, was the first reported Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") 36 case involving military reports. The plaintiff
in Kreindler represented a civilian killed in a Navy C-2A
crash.3 7 The Navy refused to produce any of the Safety Re-
- Id at 339.
21 Id at 341 (Supplemental Opinion).
21 Id
38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
.Id at 330. The reports were compiled under Air Force Regulation 127-4.




363 F.Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), subsequent optiion, 372 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
Kretnder, 363 F. Supp. at 611-12.
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ports38 or the opinions or recommendations of the JAG Man-
ual Investigation Report.3 9 The court ordered an in camera
inspection of the withheld documents and then ordered sig-
nificant portions of the reports released, including the witness
statements.40  The court could find no support in the FOIA
for withholding such statements, notwithstanding the Navy's
contention that they were covered either by exception Four
for confidential commercial information 41 or by exception
Five for inter-agency memoranda. 2 The court concluded
that there was no reason - statutory or otherwise - to order
non-disclosure of much of the material requested.43 Thus,
Kreindler parts company with Machin on the releasability of
heretofore privileged witness statements, at least in the FOIA
context.
In Thertault v. U S,44 decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit under the FOIA, the trial court ordered full
disclosures and the court of appeals reversed and remanded
with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the basis
of a privilege claim.45 Thereafter, the trial court held that
certain "opinions, conclusions, and speculations" were ex-
empt from disclosure, as were the transcripts of the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board's proceedings and witness state-
ments given under a promise of confidentiality. 46 The court
found authority for denying disclosure from FOIA exceptions
Four and Five as well as "the spirit, if not the letter" of excep-
tion One relating to military secrets.4 7
Id at 611-12. The court referred to the reports as the Aircraft Accident Report
and the Judge Advocate General Manual Investigation Report.
0, Kreindler, 363 F. Supp. at 611-12. The Navy equivalent of the Air Force Aircraft
Accident Report is now the Aircraft Mishap Investigation Report, dzscussed supra note
4.
Kreindler, 372 F. Supp. at 334-50.
Krezndler, 363 F. Supp. at 612. See also 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(4).
SKriendler, 363 F. Supp. at 612. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
Kreindler, 372 F. Supp. at 334.
4 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974), on remand, 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
- Id at 391-92.
Vi Theriault, 395 F. Supp. at 642.
41 Id at 641-42. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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In Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force,48 the court first or-
dered the disclosure of witness statements in response to a
FOIA request4 9 and then reversed itself and declined to order
their disclosure.5 ° The court based its conclusion on FOIA
exception Five and the policies contained in Mach'h.5' The
court did conclude, however, that the plaintiff should be
given the names and addresses of the witnesses whose state-
ments had been taken and required the Air Force to offer to
each witness the opportunity to review his or her statement
and decide if he or she wanted the statement disclosed.52
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and the Fifth Cir-
cuits employed reasoning similar to that utilized by the court
in Rabbitt and refused to order production of witness state-
ments in Brockway v. Department of the Air Force53 and Cooper v.
Department of the Navy.54 However, in Weber Aircraft Co. v.
United States,55 the Ninth Circuit parted company with these
circuits, disavowed earlier dictum of its own in TheriaUtt,56
and held that Safety Mishap Investigation witness state-
ments, even though given under a promise of confidentiality,
were not exempt from disclosure under FOIA" Signifi-
cantly, the court assumed the same statements would be ex-
empt from civil discovery under Machtn.58  The decision
therefore clearly implies that a civil litigant may actually be
better off proceeding under FOIA for information rather
than conducting discovery under the Federal Rules, a result
that most would find anomalous. The United States
.1 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), subsequent opinion, 401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
9 Id. at 1067.
Rabbitt, 401 F. Supp. at 1209.
Id See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
'iabbitt, 401 F. Supp. at 1209.
518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975).
54 558 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977), modifdon other grounds, 594 F.2d 484, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 926 (1979).
r'r, 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982), [rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984)]. The United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision after the date of publication of this article.
' See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
, Weber, 688 F.2d at 644.
' /d.
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Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Webe 59 and the mat-
ter was argued earlier this year.60
IV. PROBLEM AREAS
This section will examine in more detail the principal areas
of uncertainty with regard to the use and availability of the
contents of military accident reports in private civil litigation.
These areas include the current status of witness statements,
the extent to which contractor reports are privileged and fi-
nally, the admissibility of Safety Mishap Reports.
A. Witness Statements
As pointed out by the Ninth Circuit in Weber61 there is no
exemption from disclosure in the FOIA which easily covers
the situation with respect to witness statements; thus, it may
be determined by the Supreme Court in Weber that while
such statements are not privileged from disclosure under the
FOIA, they are not discoverable under the civil discovery
procedures. An additional complicating factor is that the
United States appears to be more inclined to take the posi-
tion that the FOIA should not be used by civil litigants when
they are in litigation with the United States and that requests
for information should be directed to the United States'
lawyers.
B. Contractor Reports and Waiver
Two key questions remain unresolved concerning contrac-
tor-generated reports. One is whether the contractor waives
the privilege by retaining a copy of the report or by taking
other action with respect to it, such as supplying the report to
the counsel representing it in tort litigation. It is believed by
this writer that merely retaining a copy of the report by the
contractor is proper and does not waive any privilege, but
that utilizing the report for purposes unrelated to aircraft
Weber, 103 S. Ct. 353 (1983).
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Weber on January 11, 1984 [and
handed down an opinion in 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984)].
-;' See supra text accompanying notes 55-60. See supra text accompanying notes 6-17.
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safety, for example, by showing it to counsel, is very likely to
compromise the confidentiality of the report.
Second, the Air Force's position that a contractor cannot
waive his privilege in civil litigation should he desire to utilize
for his own purposes the report he generated must be re-
jected. While the contractor privilege has the overall goal of
improving the safety of military operations, it is for the con-
tractor's protection, in order to encourage the contractor's
candor, that the exemption from disclosure for contractor-
generated information exists. Thus, the contractor should be
free to waive the privilege either intentionally because it desires
a waiver, or inadvertently by mishandling the information.
While no case has directly addressed the issue, the language
of the Brockway and Rabbill cases to the effect that witnesses
may elect to reveal their testimony to a plaintiff asserting a
right under the FOIA are consistent with this result.
C. Non-Privileged Investigations
In the Air Force there is no longer an issue regarding the
confidentiality of the Safety Mishap Investigation.62 What is
likely, however, to be a continuing issue is the admissibility of
such reports under the Public Records exception of the hear-
say rule.63 This exception allows for the admissibility in civil
actions of "factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law . . . .,6 If the
military investigator were to follow strictly the dictates of Air
Force Regulations,6 5 which require that his "opinions, con-
.; See supra text accompanying notes 6-17.
,o FED. R. EviD. 803(8), which states:
Records, reports, statements or data compliation, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency,
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id
' FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C), quoted supra note 63.
Air Force Reg. 110-14.
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clusions and recommendations" not be included in the report
but that only a "factual summary of evidence" be included,
66
then it would seem by definition that such reports would be
admissable in their entirety, assuming a sufficient showing of
trustworthiness is made. 67 The difficulty with this approach
is that in the real world reports are not written by lawyers
and the mandated distinctions between opinions and conclu-
sions, on the one hand, and factual findings, on the other, are
not strictly followed, if it is even possible in all cases to do so.
The evidentiary treatment to be given to military accident
reports is a matter that has not yet received much attention
in the courts but is likely to receive more in the future.
-~ Id
- "Trustworthiness" is an additional requirement for admission under FED. R.
EvID. 803(8)(C), quoted supra note 63.
1984] 837
838 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
APPENDIX "A"
AIR FORCE REGULATION 127-4
SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
3-1. GENERAL INFORMATION. The Air Force conducts safety investiga-
tions to find the causes of mishaps in order to prevent recurrence. The
investigating commander decides how much investigation is needed for
each mishap, based on the guidelines in this chapter.
3-2. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS. Several factors influence the scope of
investigations. How severe was the injury, occupational illness, or dam-
age? What is the probability of adverse public reaction? What is the
future mishap potential? Will an investigation by another agency pro-
duce a report which can be used for Air Force mishap prevention? Inves-
tigating commanders should not feel committed to a full board
investigation merely because one was appointed during the early phases.
If it becomes apparent that a single investigator can do the job, the re-
maining board members may be released. Use the following guidelines to
decide what kind of an investigation to convene:
A. SEVERITY OF INJURY, OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS, DAMAGE. Mis-
haps which result from Air Force operations can be prevented more easily
than those outside the sphere of direct Air Force influence. When mis-
haps result in severe injury or damage from Air Force operations, an ex-
tensive investigation is needed. Often, persons representing several
investigative areas are needed to reconstruct the sequence of events, iden-
tify causes, and recommend preventive actions. For such complex investi-
gations, commanders should normally convene boards. However, in some
mishaps involving severe injury, illness, or damage, the causes and pre-
ventive actions may be evident at the outset of the investigation. In these
cases, investigating commanders may decide to appoint individual inves-
tigators, rather than convening boards.
B. POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION. Air Force policy requires
the public be fully informed of events which are adverse to the public
interest. Such events include costly accidental losses of Air Force re-
sources and serious injury or damage to non-Air Force people or property.
Careful documentation of these mishaps is often so complex that board
investigations are needed.
C. MISHAP POTENTIAL. The potential for mishap recurrence may
suggest the need for a more extensive investigation, even though damage,
injury, illness, or possible adverse public reaction may be minimal. Inves-
tigating commanders convene boards for mishaps when it seems that ex-
tensive documentation will be needed to support preventive actions.
D. INVESTIGATION BY OTHER AGENCIES. Mishaps occurring outside
the direct sphere of Air Force influence may be investigated by other
agencies. Although some level of reporting is required, an Air Force in-
vestigation may not be needed to acquire the information. The informa-
tion for reports required by this regulation may often be extracted
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directly from other investigation reports. These include reports of such
other agencies as the local police and state highway patrol.
E. CONTRACTOR MISHAPS, When mishaps result from Government
contractor operations and cause reportable losses to government re-
sources, they must be investigated and reported:
(1) If the Air Force administers the contracts and mishaps involve
reportable losses to Air Force resources, Air Force administration person-
nel will prepare the reports required by this regulation with as much in-
formation as available within the terms of the contract.
(2) If the Air Force administers the contracts and mishaps involve
reportable losses to resources of other DOD agencies, Air Force adminis-
tration personnel will forward all mishap information to the involved
agency with an information copy to HQAFISC/SER.
(3) If another DOD agency administers the contracts, the con-
tracting MAJCOM will make sure the loss is investigated and enter a
record of mishap into the Air Force's mishap reporting system.
(4) When the mishap concerns government property in the contrac-
tor's possession, the contractor will not be required to provide information
beyond the terms of the contract. Contractor mishaps must be investi-
gated and reported even though the government is reimbursed in whole
or part.
3-3. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS. They investigate and prepare reports of
mishaps either individually or as members of boards. In either case, the
investigating officer is a key to providing a credible report. During a
safety investigation, the investigating officer is relieved of all other duties.
He or she is furnished clerical and technical assistance, transportation,
communications, and other facilities and services as necessary. Guidelines
for appointing safety investigating officers are listed below. When a fully
qualified individual is not available, the investigating officer is selected
from the most qualified individuals available. If selected investigating of-
ficer does not have safety experience, investigation background, or work-
ing knowledge of AFR 127-4, the convening authority's safety staff should
assist in details of compiling the formal report.
NOTE: The term Investigating Officer as used here includes noncommis-
sioned officers (NCO) or civilians who are appointed to investigate
ground and explosives mishaps.
A. APPOINTING AIRCRAFT FLIGHT, MISSILE, SPACE; AND NUCLEAR
SAFETY INVESTIGATING OFFICERS. Each Air Force wing and higher level
commander (and geographically separated unit commander) appoints
one or more officer(s)to investigate these mishaps. Reserve force unit
commanders appoint one or more Guardsmen or Reservists to investigate
these mishaps. When a Class A mishap is investigated by a single investi-
gating officer, he or she is selected in the same manner as a board presi-
dent (paragraph 3-4a). Investigating officers for Class B and C mishaps
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may be selected from within the organization that had the mishap. This
also applies to all FOD mishaps.
B. APPOINTING INVESTIGATING OFFICERS FOR GROUND, EXPLO-
SIVES, AND AIRCRAFT NONFLIGHT MISHAPS. Each Air Force base, wing,
and higher level commander appoints one or more qualified investigators
for ground, explosives, and aircraft nonflight mishaps. Reserve force unit
commanders also appoint one or more qualified investigators for ground
and explosives mishaps.
C. INVESTIGATING OFFICER AND NCO QUALIFICATIONS:
(1) For Flight Mishap. Must be rated officer with at least 4 years
rated service as a pilot or navigator. Preferably, he or she should be a
graduate of the USAF Flight Safety Officers' Course or the USAF Air-
craft Mishap Investigation Course. Current or previous qualification in
the mishap aircraft is desirable.
EXCEPTION: Safety NCOs or civilians may investigate Class C and
HAP flight mishaps when no operator factor is involved.
(2) For a Missile Mishap. Should be a missile maintenance or oper-
ations officer, munitions officer, or missile safety officer. For air launched
missile or RPV aircraft mishaps, the flight safety officer may be the inves-
tigating officer.
(3) For a Space Mishap. Should be a missile maintenance, mis-
sile/space system engineer, or operations officer.
(4) For a Nuclear Mishap. Should be an officer qualified in stor-
age, maintenance, transportation, operation, or loading and mating of the
weapon system involved. For nuclear power systems or minor radioactive
sources, the investigating officer should know the nuclear system or mater-
ials and the related hazards involved.
(5) For a Ground, Aircraft Nonflight, or Ground (Missile or Space
involvement) Mishap. May be a ground safety officer (military or civil-
ian), or NCO, maintenance officer, or rated officer, as appropriate. The
investigating commander may appoint an NCO to investigate the mis-
hap, provided that person is senior to the individual(s) involved in the
mishap. The NCO must either be from a unit not involved in the mishap
or from the next higher supervisory echelon of the unit that had the mis-
hap. (The local safety staff will provide assistance.)
(6) For an Explosives Mishap. Should be an officer or civilian who
knows the effects and technical aspects of the design, construction, proper-
ties, use, and functioning of all items involved. The investigator should
be trained or experienced in mishap investigation. Class B explosives or
missile mishaps involving aircraft damage during flight may be investi-
gated by a flight safety officer.
3-4. INVESTIGATING BOARDS. The investigating commander decides
whether the mishap should be investigated by an individual or a board.
If a comprehensive effort is indicated, an investigation board is convened.
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When a board is convened, the board member activities prescribed by
this regulation take precedence over all their other duties.
A. APPOINTING SAFETY INVESTIGATION BOARD PRESIDENTS. Each
Air Force base, wing, and higher level commander keeps a list of person-
nel qualified for safety investigation boards. Only required basic mem-
bers need to be listed. Flight, missile, space, and nuclear boards are not
established below wing or equivalent level (see paragraph 1-5c). Follow
these instructions for appointing investigation board presidents for Class
A flight, missile, and space mishaps and nuclear accidents:
(1) The board president is appointed from officer resources other
than those of the wing or equivalent organization that had the mishap.
(2) If the first level below the major command is a wing or
equivalent level(or lower), the board president is appointed by the major
command.
B. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A SAFETY INVESTI-
GATING BOARD. (AFR 11-31 does not apply.)
(1) The size and membership of the board depends on the kind of
mishap being investigated. Paragraph c through f below describes basic
board membership for most types of mishaps. For a more complex mis-
hap, a group board may be needed. In this case, span of control problems
can be minimized by using the basic board voting members as a coordina-
tion group. The coordination group leader is normally the investigating
officer. The remaining coordination group members are normally the
leaders of subgroups, such as operations, materiel, human factors, and so
forth. The additional voting and nonvoting board members are assigned
or attached to these subgroups. This organization structure is suggested,
but not mandatory. Investigating commanders may organize group
boards in any way which fits their investigative and reporting needs.
(2) Each board should have one or more members equal to or se-
nior in rank to the senior person directly involved in the mishap. Nor-
mally, the board president is the senior board member.
(3) Board members should not have a personal interest in the inves-
tigations; each should be able to act impartially.
(4) Each board must have a member qualified to investigate each
safety area when more than one is involved.
(5) The system manager or item manager and any involved test
organization decide if they will take part in the investigation. If so, they
inform the investigating major commander, preferably within 24 hours
after the mishap.
c. AIRCRAFT FLIGHT SAFETY INVESTIGATION BOARD. Boards for
flight mishaps are made up of the following members:
(1) Required Basic Membership. The following are voting
members:
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(a) A Board president who is a rated pilot or navigator. For
Class A flight mishaps, the president is a colonel or higher.
(b) An investigating officer qualified as in paragraph 3-3c(1).
(c) A pilot member currently on flying status and qualified in the
involved aircraft.
(d) A maintenance member, who is a fully qualified mainte-
nance officer with 2 years maintenance experience in the involved
aircraft.
(e) A medical officer qualified in aerospace medicine.
(2) Additional Voting Members Required Under Certain
Conditions:
(a) An air traffic control officer when air traffic control is known
or suspected to have been a factor in the mishap. The convening author-
ity will coordinate with HQAFCC/AT when an air traffic control officer
is required.
(b) A weather officer when weather or weather service is known
or suspected to have been a cause of the mishap.
(c) A munitions officer, EOD officer or NCO, or nuclear safety
officer if a nuclear weapon or warhead is involved.
(d) A representative of the commander whose aircraft or opera-
tor was involved in the mishap if that commander so requests.
(e) An officer knowledgeable in nuclear power systems or minor
radioactive sources if such systems are involved.
(f) An AFOTEC representative when AFOTEC managed
OT&E is involved.
(3) Required Nonvoting Members:
(a) An officer or senior noncommissioned officer familiar with
administrative procedures is the board recorder.
(b) A life support officer if life support equipment may be
involved.
(c) Representatives of the Directors of Aerospace Safety or Nu-
clear Surety when those organizations decide to take part.
(d) Representatives of aircraft system or item managers of Air
Force test organizations when those organizations decide to take part.
(e) Representatives from the FAA or NTSB when those organi-
zations request participation. (See AFR 127-11.)
(f) A safety advisor if a trained safety officer is not already a
member of the flight safety investigating board.
(4) Optional Assistance at the Investigating Commander's
Discretion:
(a) Additional crewmembers qualified in the involved aircraft.
(b) Technical personnel in the areas of research, development,
testing, production, or logistic support of the aircraft, or with expertise in
the design deficiency.
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D. MISSILE MISHAP INVESTIGATING BOARD:
(1) Required Basic Membership. Each board has at least voting
members as follows:
(a) An officer qualified in missile maintenance, engineering, or
munitions.
(b) An officer qualified in the operational use of the missile
system.
(c) A medical services officer, qualified in aerospace medicine. If
the missile mishap is clearly due to materiel failure, the medical member
is not required. Another officer qualified in missile maintenance and en-
gineering is substituted.
(2) Additional Voting Members Required Under Certain Cond-
tions. (Same as for flight board.)
(3) Optional Assistance at the Investigating Commander's Discre-
tion. The following may be invited as advisors or consultants (nonvoting
members) to the investigating board:
(a) Representatives from other federal agencies.
(b) Technical personnel in the areas of research, development,
testing, production, or logistic support of the missile or missile support
equipment.
(c) Representatives of missile system or item managers or Air
Force test organizations when organizations decide to take part.
(d) Additional nonvoting members, as required.
(4) If a trained weapons safety officer or specialist is not a member
of the missile safety investigating board, appoint one as a safety advisor,
nonvoting member.
(5) The board composition for missile mishaps involving Class A or
B aircraft damage during flight may be established in accordance with
paragraph 3-4c.
E. SPACE MISHAP INVESTIGATING BOARD:
(1) Required Basic Membership. Each board has at least three vot-
ing members as follows:
(a) An officer qualified in missile maintenance, or missile/space
system engineering.
(b) An officer qualified in the operational use of space system.
(c) A medical services officer, qualified in aerospace medicine. If
the space mishap is clearly due to materiel failure, the medical member is
not required. Another officer qualified in space systems is substituted.
(2) Additional voting members required under certain conditions.
(Same as for flight board.)
(3) Optional assistance at the Investigating Commander's discre-
tion. The following may be invited as advisors or consultants (nonvoting
members) to the investigating board:
(a) Representatives from the federal agencies.
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(b) Technical personnel in the areas of research, development,
testing, production, or logistics support of the space system or space sys-
tem support equipment.
(c) Representatives of space systems or item managers or Air
Force test organizations decide to take part.
(d) Additional nonvoting members, as required.
(4) If a trained safety officer or specialist is not a member of the
space systems investigating board, appoint one as a safety advisor, non-
voting member.
F. NUCLEAR MISHAP INVESTIGATING BOARD:
(1) Required Basic Membership for a Nuclear Weapon Mishap.
For a nuclear weapon mishap not occurring together with a flight or mis-
sile mishap, use a least the following four voting members:
(a) An officer qualified in the operation of the nuclear weapon
carrier.
(b) An officer qualified in storage, maintenance, transportation,
or loading and mating of the weapon system.
(c) An EOD officer or NCO.
(d) A nuclear safety investigating officer.
(2) Membership for Nuclear Power System or Minor Radioactive
Source Mishaps. At least the following two voting members are required:
(a) An officer knowledgeable of the reactor or radioisotope
system.
(b) A medical services officer or health physicist knowledgeable
in radiation effects and contamination.
(3) Additional Membership Required Under Certain Conditions:
(a) A Department of Energy (DOE) representative when DOE-
DOD agreements apply for the system involved.
(b) A medical officer for human factors and other medical
aspects.
(c) Additional specialists as required by the nature of the mishap.
(4) Other required Nonvoting Members. Same as c(3) above.
G. GROUND, EXPLOSIVES, OR AIRCRAFT NONFLIGHT MISHAP INVES-
TIGATING BOARDS:
(1) Required Membership. The board consists of at least the
following:
(a) A president in the grade of major/GS- 12 or higher. If a field
grade officer is not available, the investigating commander may waive the
grade requirement.
(b) An investigating officer qualified as in paragraph 3-3b, but
preferably a flight, ground or explosives safety officer, as applicable.
(c) A medical services officer knowledgeable in the medical or
environmental health factors involved. If it is clear that environmental
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health or medical factors are not involved, a medical services officer is not
required.
(d) A motor vehicle maintenance officer, if a motor vehicle is
involved.
(e) A security and law enforcement officer (for a motor vehicle
mishap).
(f) An EOD officer or NCO, as appropriate.
(g) A technician qualified in munitions maintenance if materiel
failure or design deficiency is suspected to be the cause of an explosives
mishap. This technician should be familiar with the design, construction,
properties, use, and functioning of all explosives items involved.
(h) An AFOTEC representative when AFOTEC managed
OT&E is involved.
(2) Optional Assistance at the Investigating Commander's Discre-
tion. Other technical personnel depending on the nature of the mishap.
(3) The board composition for explosives mishaps involving Class A
or B aircraft damage during flight may be established in accordance with
paragraph 3-4c.
H. AUTHORITY FOR INTERSERVICE USE OF PERSONNEL IN MISHAP
INVESTIGATIONS:
(1) There is sometimes a need for the Navy, Army, or Coast Guard
to take part in an Air Force mishap investigation. This happens when the
aircraft, facilities, material, or personnel of another US military service
are involved. In such mishaps, both the Air Force and the other service
have a vested interest. Authority to use other military services personnel
is requested from the Directorate of Aerospace Safety or Nuclear Surety.
If authority is granted the non-Air Force member personally engages in
the investigation and aids in the preparation of the report. The investiga-
tion and the report are done according to this regulation. An extra copy
of the rpeort is sent to the Director of Aerospace Safety or Nuclear Surety
for forwarding to the other service.
(2) Collisions between an Air Force aircraft and an aircraft of an-
other service may be investigated by a joint board. This requires mutual
agreement between the two safety centers. Reports are prepared on the
individual forms and in the formats required by each service. The word-
ing of findings may vary to fit the needs of the individual services. How-
ever, the meaning of the findings or cause factors must not conflict.
(3) If, for any reason, a joint board cannot be convened, two in-
dependent investigations are conducted using each service's reporting di-
rective. An extra copy of the report is sent to the Director of Aerospace
Safety for forwarding to the other service.
(4) Sometimes a flight mishap involves an aircraft common to an-
other US military service (see table 4-3). Personnel from the other service
may be asked to take part in the Air Force investigation as "an ob-
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server(s)." The investigating commander makes this request through the
Director of Aerospace Safety. The invitation is then extended to the
safety center of the other service. An invited observer(s) is not a member
of the board. An extra copy of the report is sent to the Director of Aero-
space Safety for forwarding to the other service.
I. CONDUCT OF AN INVESTGATION IN WHICH NATIONAL TRANSPOR-
TATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB) OR FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRA-
TION (FAA) RESPONSIBILITIES ARE INVOLVED:
(1) When mishaps occur between Air Force and civil aircraft, the
NTSB is responsible for the investigation. The NTSB provides for the Air
Force to participate, at the discretion of the Director of Aerospace Safety
(see AFR 127-11). If the Air Force takes part in such an investigation or
public hearing, it does so as "a party to" the investgation or hearing. The
Air Force may conduct a separate and independent investigation accord-
ing to this regulation. The Air Force investigation must not interfere with
the NTSB investigation. The Air Force board president complies with
AFR 127-11 when requesting information from, or releasing information
to, the NTSB.
(2) A military flight mishap may involve a function of the FAA. If
so, the investigating commander provides for the FAA to take part in the
military investigation as prescribed by AFR 127-11.
(3) Cooperation between NTSB and FAA personnel and the Air
Force in these investigations is essential. If the military investigation re-
ferred to in (2) above concludes FAA personnel or facilities were causal in
the mishap, comply with AFR 127-11. Notification through proper chan-
nels will make sure corrective action can be taken by the FAA.
3-5. INVESTIGATIVE EVIDENCE:
A. IMPOUNDMENT OF AIR FORCE MATERIAL. Mishap investigations
have inherent priorities over other activities and investigations connected
to the mishap. Among these is the right of investigators to impound Air
Force property involved in the mishap. Investigators should understand
these priorities, but it is also important to know their limitations. For
example, rescue of personnel and saving of hazardous materials always
takes precedence, even at the risk of losing evidence. Or, an installation
commander may elect to remove wreckage which is interfering with im-
portant mission activities or which is a hazard at the mishap scene. Apart
from such limitations, safety investigators may impound Air Force mate-
rial and documents which are relevant to the investigation. Investigators
may also get copies of recorded communications from communications
activities and transcripts of relevant FAA recordings.
B. HUMAN FACTORS INVESTIGATION. Evidence as to the physical
and mental conditions of persons involved in mishaps is also important.
Additionally, medical opinion as to the capability of these individuals to
return to their duties is often required.
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(1) Chapter 11 has instructions for the medical member of investi-
gating boards on the kinds of physiological evidence required.
(2) When human remains are not located on federal property, they
may or may not be under the jurisdiction of civil authorities. Investiga-
tors should consult with the mortuary officer of the supporting base to
determine whether or not civil authorities have jurisdiction. The mortu-
ary officer will more than likely have a memorandum of understanding
with civil authorities according to AFR 143-1.
C. PHOTOGRAPHING EVIDENCE. Photography can be helpful in pre-
serving otherwise perishable evidence. Photographs are made mainly to
assist the investigation; their use as exhibits in the report is also a consid-
eration. Liberal use of photography in all phases of the investigation is
recommended. However, the pictures selected for later inclusion in the
report should be limited.
D. WITNESSES. Physical and documentary evidence are the most
credible forms of evidence. However, the accounts of witnesses often pro-
vide important (and sometimes the only) leads as to the causes. Witnesses
include those involved in the mishap, those who only saw it, and those
whose training and experience qualify them as experts. The appearance
of witnesses before an investigator or board is governed by the following:
(1) Witnesses may not be administered truth serums, hypnotic tech-
niques, drugs, or polygraph tests. If a statement is provided by a witness
under medication, a notation so indicating is added to the statement.
(2) Witnesses do not testify under oath and are not sworn.
(3) Witnesses in aircraft, missile, space, or nuclear safety investiga-
tions are advised before testifying of the purpose of the investigation. The
sole purpose of the investigation is to determine all factors relating to the
mishap in order to preclude recurrence. The basis for this advice is the
Air Force claim of privilege for the statements given in confidence by
these witnesses (paragraph 1-9). It is a guarantee of confidentiality and is
given to encourage frank and open communications.
(4) Witnesses in other safety investigations are advised that the
main purpose of the investigation is to determine all factors relating to the
mishap in order to preclude recurrence. No guarantee of confidentiality
is given, because general-use mishap reports are not protected by the
claim of privilege. Moreover, Air Force witnesses are treated according to
(5) below.
(5) The purpose of safety investigations reports prescribed in this
regulation is mishap prevention. However, no protection beyond this as-
sertion can be offered to Air Force personnel involved in investgations
producing general-use reports. Suspect witnesses should be advised of
their rights under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution (civilian), or
Article 31, UCMJ (military). Providing AF Form 1168, Statement of
Suspect, for signature of the suspect witness fulfills this purpose. A wit-
ness may be considered suspect when evidence indicates he or she may
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have contributed to the mishap. In questionable cases, ask the staff judge
advocate.
(6) Sometimes investigations are initiated under the limited use
provisions of paragraphs 1-9 and (3) above and are then recategorized as
general use investigations. When this occurs, all statements obtained
under a promise of confidentiality must be considered invalid and shall
not be used for any purpose. Investigators must then contact all wit-
nesses, inform them of the procedural change and either obtain a new
statement or give them the opportunity to affirm their previous
statement.
E. DISPOSTION OF EVIDENCE. Investigators keep materials used as ev-
idence only as long as needed to complete the investigation and write the
report.
(1) Keep Air Force equipment which is damaged beyond repair un-
til all investigators indicate it is no longer needed. Safety investigators
make disposition in one of these ways:
(a) Forward exhibits supporting MDRs, TDR requests, and lab-
oratory evaluations according to paragraph 3-7. Dispose of TDR exhibits
according to AFM 67-1, volume I.
(b) If there is an AFR 110-14 investigation, wreckage should be
turned over to the accident investgator(s) through the investigating com-
mander. Make sure the responsible person in the accident investigation
knows the wreckage is available and acknowledges custodial responsiblity.
Also, tell the host commander of the transfer. If the accident investiga-
tor(s) says the wreckage is not required in that investigation, proceed as in
(c) below.
(c) Release wreckage not needed in support of depot, laboratory,
or accident investigations to the base commander for salvage. (See para-
graph 3-6.) Dispose of lost, damaged, or destroyed property according to
AFM 67-1, volume I.
(2) Return Air Force equipment which is not damaged beyond re-
pair to the possessing organization as soon as possible. This is subject to
the prior needs of an accident investigatior. Try to expedite the investi-
gation of repairable equipment so it may be returned to service without
excessive delay.
(3) Provide all nonprivileged evidence to the AFR 110-14 Investi-
gation Board.
(a) Original documentation (paragraph 1-9f) will be given to the
AFR 110-14 investigator(s): Readable copies will do for the Safety
Report.
(b) If there is no AFR 110-14 investigation and HQ USAF/JA
has not notified the board of special needs coordinate with HQ
USAF/JACC, through the Staff Judge Advocate, to ascertain whether
any discovery requests pertaining to evidence in the hands of the safety
board have been directed to the Air Force. If there is no such requests
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original documents and records used by the Safety Board should be re-
turned to their proper custodian for use/destruction per Air Force Direc-
tives after reproducing enough copies for the Safety Report.
(4) Privileged documentary evidence must be carefully controlled
by the Safety Investigation Board. Privileged documentary evidence in-
cludes witness statements and testimony. Inputs from contractor repre-
sentatives (acquired under promise of confidentiality), drafts indicating
the board's analysis and conclusions, privileged photo-
graphs/films/videotapes, cockpit voice recordings/transcripts of intra
cockpit conversations, diagrams, and other exhibits. Documents gener-
ated by the Safety Board must be included in Part II of the report or
destroyed along with any excess privileged materials not needed for the
formal report. Internal board working papers must also be destroyed. If
there is a need to retain any document for briefing purposes, all such doc-
uments should be placed in a folder, marked as privileged safety board
investigation materials, and maintained under seal until no longer needed
and then destroyed.
(5) Return usable personal equipment or protective gear to surviv-
ing possessors of record or to the issuing authority. This is subject to the
prior needs of'an accident investigation.
3-6. PROCEDURES FOR RECOVERY AND DISPOSITION OF WRECKAGE.
Except to do essential rescue operations or prevent interference to air op-
erations or vital civil functions, do not destroy or remove wreckage with-
out the agreement of the investigator(s). Investigators should advise the
appropriate authorities when all evidence required to determine cause
factors has been obtained (paragraph 3-5).
A. ASSISTANCE IN WRECKAGE RECOVERY. The investigators may re-
quest, through the investigating commander, wreckage recovery assist-
ance from the nearest military base. For information on availability of
required equipment, the investigating commander may contact the cogni-
zant Navy or Coast Guard district commandant, Air Force headquarters,
or Army area headquarters, as appropriate.
B. REMOVAL OF WRECKAGE FROM MISHAP SCENE. When the inves-
tigators have no further need for wreckage at the scene, the investigating
commander makes sure that it is removed. The scene must be policed for
evidence of human remains and parts of aircraft, explosives, missiles, vehi-
cles, weapons and carbon fiber material. The investigating commander
retains the wreckage if additional investigation, testing or study of the
wreckage is needed.
(1) Potential Litigation. If litigation may occur as a result of a mis-
hap (coordinate with HQ USAF/JACC), the wreckage must not be dis-
posed of without permission of The Judge Advocate General, HQ USAF.
(2) Wreckage in Populated Areas. If wreckage falls in populated
areas, prompt removal may be the best course of action. The investigat-
ing commander or the nearest Air Force base commander makes this de-
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termination and takes proper action. In questionable cases, consult with
the Directorate of Aerospace Safety.
(3) Submerged Wreckage. Sometimes recovery or salvage of sub-
merged wreckage is required but is beyond the capabilities of the base
concerned. In this case, the investigating commander may request help
from the US Navy as follows:
(a) Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Attn: Supervisor
of Salvage, Wash DC 20362, telephone number: AUTOVON 227-7386,
7403, or 7413. For commercial calls, dial Area Code 202 and use the
prefix 697 (692-5727 nights and holidays). Telephone requests require a
followup message per instructions given by the supervisor of salvage. If
the initial request is made by message, include the following:
1. Exact location of wreckage, if known.
2. Whether wreckage is marked by buoy.
3. Type of ordnance on board aircraft, if any.
4. Whether classified material is on board.
5. Funding information. Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR)E-103 provides for the Navy to advance funds to private compa-
nies for immediate financing for salvage operations. (Also see 10 U.S.C.
7364.)
6. Air Force personnel to contact (message address and tele-
phone numbers).
(b) Include as information addressees:
1. Chief of Naval Operations, Wash DC
2. Commandant, applicable naval district. For European and
Middle East area: CINCUSNAVEUR.
3. The cognizant fleet commander, if outside the CONUS.
(For Pacific: "CINCPACFLT. Far East: Commander Seventh Fleet." For
Atlantic: "CINCLANTFLT Norfolk VA.")
(4) Nuclear, Explosives, or Radioactive Wreckage. The investigat-
ing commander is responsible for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and security
of the area until relieved by higher authority or the organization having
physical possession of the component at the time of mishap. (See AFR
355-1.) Additional assistance may be requested from:
(a) 2701st EOD Squadron, Hill AFB UT 84406 (telephone
number: (801) 77-5501; AUTOVON 458-5501), for Explosives Ordnance
Disposal (EOD), monitoring, and decontaminating assistance.
(b) AF Operations Center, Wash DC 20330 (telephone: (202)
697-6103), when additional technical advice or medical assistance is
required.
(c) Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC), Kirt-
land AFB NM 87117 (telephone: (505) 844-8279 or AUTOVON 244-
8279). JNACC catalogs more than 500 response teams worldwide, in-
cluding complete data on location and capability.
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C. OBLITERATING OR MARKING ABANDONED AIRCRAFT, SPACE OR
MISSILE WRECKAGE. All wreckage which cannot be removed from the
mishap scene should be obliterated or marked. Do this according to one
of these procedures, listed in order of preference:
(1) Regular Wreckage Disposal. Dismantle the wreckage as much
as possible, and bury the residue when terrain and accessibility permit.
(2) Unusual Wreckage Disposal. When wreckage burial is imprac-
tical, use explosive demolition to scatter parts in small pieces over the
widest area possible. Explosive demolition must be done by qualified
EOD personnel. Use established procedures and coordinate with the re-
sponsible civil authorities. Care must be taken to prevent forest fires or
damage to public or private property.
(3) Undisposable Wreckage. Mark all wreckage that cannot be cis-
posed of with a large and conspicuous yellow painted cross. Give the ex-
act location of the wreckage by coordinates, together with photographs
showing configuration of wreckage, to the Air Rescue Center(s).
(4) Inaccessible Wreckage. Sometimes wreckage is so inaccessible
that the methods above cannot be used. In such a case, carefully plot and
photograph it from as low an altitude as practicable. Furnish:
(a) Air search activities the exact location and a photograph
showing the configuration of the wreckage.
(b) The Air Rescue Center(s) the exact location of the wreckage
by coordinates and photographs showing configuration or wreckage.
NOTE: Abandonment of wreckage as explained above does not mean
legal abandonment of title. Action to give up title is governed by AFM
67-1.
3-7. INVESTIGATION OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE, MALFUNCTION, OR IN-
ADEQUATE DESIGN:
A. METHODS. Three procedures are generally available for determin-
ing the reason for the failure or malfunction:
(1) Local Investigation. If the manner of the failure or malfunction
is readily apparent, local investigators may be able to find the cause.
(2) Technical Assistance. Additional technical assistance beyond
the resources of the investigating commander may be required. If techni-
cal specialists are needed at the site of the investigation, make a request
according to paragraph 3-8.
(3) Priority Teardown Deficiency Report (TDR). TDRs are part
of the Air Force Product Improvement Program and the Materiel
Defeciency Reporting System. These are described in AFR 66-30 and
TO 00-35D-54. Request priority TDRs through the system manager
(SM), item manager (IM), or program manager (PM), by submitting
Category I materiel deficiency reports (MDR) or service reports (SR). If
a TDR is requested, no disassembly of the exhibit should be attempted in
the field.
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t B. USING THE AIR FORCE MATERIEL DEFICIENCY REPORTING SYS-
TEM. If a materiel deficiency is known or suspected to be a cause of an
Air Force mishap, submit a Category I MDR or SR on the item. A Cate-
gory I MDR or SR is also used when failure is not suspected but a TDR is
needed.
(1) Field Investigators' Responsibilities. The safety investigating
board or officer makes sure that MDRs or SRs are sent for materiel defi-
ciencies known or suspected to be causal. They make sure that exhibits
are kept and shipped as instructed and that notification of shipment is
sent. They insure that the mishap control number is referenced in the
MDR/SR subject line. Finally, they take followup action to make sure
exhibits were received and TDRs are in progress.
(a) A mishap Category I MDR or SR may be prepared and sent
by the maintenance member of an investigation board. Include final dis-
position instructions for the exhibit, if possible.
(b) Handle exhibits to be shipped for TDR according to TO 00-
35D-54. TO 00-85-20 tells how to mark engines for TDR.
(c) When an engine/equipment is seht for TDR due to personnel
ingestion, the field investigator in conjunction with local mortuary affairs
and the chief of maintenance, will make every effort to remove human
remains from the exhibit prior to shipment. They will also ensure the
shipping documents are properly marked according to TO 00-35D-54,
and attach a prominent marking indicating that engine/equipment was
involved in a personnel ingestion mishap.
(2) Combined Class C Mishap and Category 1 Reports (or Dull
Sword). A provision of TO 00-35D-54 allows for combining the Class C
mishap report and Category 1 MDR or SR. This may be done when the
only cause(s) of the mishap was materiel failure or malfunction or design
deficiency. Do not submit combined reports when there is personnel in-
volvement or when reportable injuries are sustained in the mishap. These
reports are not privileged or designated as limited-use reports, even
though their subjects may be flight, missile, or nuclear mishaps. When
combined Class C ground mishap message reports are submitted, do not
submit an AF Form 71 la, Ground Mishap Report. Do no mark com-
bined reports For Official Use Only. Format for the combined report is
spelled out in TO 00-35D-54, Section III.
(3) Investigating Major Commander's Responsibility. If the final
mishap report was sent before receipt of all TDRs, the investigating
MAJCOM should take followup action. If final exhibit disposition in-
structions were not included in the original request for TDR, provide
them to the SM, IM, or PM.
(4) AFLC and AFSC Responsibilities. AFLC and AFSC respond
to requests for Priority TDRs as required by AFR 66-30, TO 00-35D-54,
and command directives. Exhibits sent for Priority TDR are not disposed
of without written approval of the investigating commander. A prelimi-
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nary report of Priority TDR findings is furnished to the field investiga-
tor(s) as soon as possible to assist in compiling the final mishap report.
Handling instructions for the final TDR are as stated in AFLC or AFSC
publications. TDRs related to Air Force mishaps must refer to the mis-
hap control number (paragraph 4-7). Distribution of TDRs is as follows:
(a) One copy to the Director of Aerospace Safety or Nuclear
Surety. (Attach all supporting documents, such as metallurgical analysis,
photographs, test reports, and soforth to this copy.) For Class A and B (or
nuclear) mishaps, provide the documents as soon as they are available. If
the TDR and backup data were not previously sent, they may be at-
tached to the Air Logistics Center (ALC) or program office indorsement
(paragraph 13-6). For HAP mishaps, forward the TDR to the Director of
Aerospace Safety upon completion. Identify the mishap by using the mis-
hap control number assigned to the mishap message report and repeating
times 1 through 4 of the message report.
(b) One copy to the organization that requested the TDR. If the
mishap investigation board has forwarded its final report, send this copy
to the investigating MAJCOM.
(c) One copy to the MAJCOM have jurisdiction over the organi-
zation possessing the aircraft. An additional copy should be sent to NGB
for Air National Guard mishaps and HQ AFRES for Air Force Reserve
mishaps.
(d) One copy to ASD/SE, Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433, if
the mishap involved an aircraft or a nonspace vehicle. (For missiles other
than ballistic missiles, forward one copy to ASD if required by table 12-2,
line 7.)
(e) One copy to Space Division/SE, PO Box 92960, Worldway
Postal Center, Los Angeles, CA 90009, if the mishap involved a system or
component used by a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.
(f) One copy to the cognizant AFSC System Program Office or
AFLC System Manager, whichever has engineering authority for the item
in question.
3-8. USING EXPERT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM RESOURCES
OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMAND. A variety of
technical specialists are available to assist field investigators. The
paragraphs which follow tell how to get and use expert technical assist-
ance during field investigations:
A. DETERMINING THE NEED FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. The field
investigation needs to consider all factors influencing the mishap and sur-
vival sequences. In most cases, there is early evidence that eliminates
many possible factors. Those factors so eliminated should not be pursued,
even though all the details may not be known. Pursuing them would not
help the investigation toward its goal and would result in wasteful ex-
penditures. Those factors which remain after the initial evaluation, how-
ever, are investigated until their roles are either confirmed or eliminated.
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When the investigation of these factors is beyond the scope of the ap-
pointed investigators, technical assistance should be requested. At this
point, discontinue further processing of the evidence (such as disassem-
bling components) pending arrival of the requested specialist. If items are
to be sent to a laboratory in lieu of on-site inspection, handle them only as
instructed by the agency which will do the analysis. At times the services
of the FBI, FAA or the NTSB might be requested for voice tape repair,
enhancement, or analysis. Make sure the Air Force maintains custody of
all materials. After analysis all materials and analyses must be accounted
for by the safety mishap investigation board.
B. REQUESTING AND USING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
(1) Technical Assistance. Technical assistance from resources other
than those of the investigating command will be obtained through the
AFISC mishap technical assistance unit. In response to valid requests for
assistance, AFISC will determine the best available source for the assist-
ance and arrange for it to be furnished. Sources include HQ
USAF/LEEE, AFLC, AFSC, AFIP, AFESC, OSI, NTSV, FAA, other
services, and industry. EXCEPTION: Overseas commands may use tech-
nical assistance already available within their own resources in the over-
seas area without coordination with AFISC. Assistance furnished from
CONUS sources will be coordinated with AFISC.
(2) Procedures. Contact AFISC technical assistance unit either di-
rectly or through the investigating command safety staff. If contact is
direct, response will be coordinated with the MAJCOM safety staff.
Message address: HQ AFISC Norton AFB CA/SEP AUTOVON: Nor-
mal duty hours (0730-1630 PST/PDT)-876-2581; AUTOVON: Other
times 876-1110. Ask for 63 MAW Command Post.
(3) Technical Specialists. When technical specialists support a
safety investigation they are under the control authority of the board
president or investigating officer. This applies to DOD military and civil-
ian personnel as well as to contractor or manufacturer representatives.
When technical specialists complete their investigations they are expected
to report the results of their work to the safety investigators. These re-
ports may be written or oral. Reports submitted by DOD personnel are
placed in Part I of the formal safety report. Reports submitted by con-
tractor personnel assigned (by contract) to an ALC/DOD agency (but
not employed by a contractor who designed, manufactured, or main-
tained the equipment or weapons system) will also be included in Part I
of the formal safety report. In unique instances wherein an ALC or an
assigned contrator representative is required to provide the safety board
an opinion relating to the cause of a mishap, that information will be
delivered separately to the safety board and included in Part II of the
safety report. In all cases, the Part I reports submitted by ALC or as-
signed contractor personnel will conform to the format at figure 3-1 to
this regulation. Review these reports to ensure they do not contain refer-
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ences to privileged sources such as pilot, crewmember or operator testi-
mony, or materials provided by contractors under a promise of
confidentiality. Reports submitted by representatives of contractors who
design, manufacture, or maintain equipment involved in a mishap are
placed in Part II of the formal safety report.
3-9. SABOTAGE AND OTHER AFOSI INTERESTS:
a. If sabotage is suspected, a safety investigation is initiated under this
regulation. It is done at the same time as the sabotage investigation re-
quired by AFR 205-57. The safety investigation continues until com-
pleted, or until sabotage is confirmed as the cause of the mishap. If
sabotage is established as the cause:
(1) Discontinue the safety investigation.
(2) Give all (except witness statements and contractor inputs) ma-
terial held by the safety investigator(s) to the agency conducting the sabo-
tage investigation. Also give them the names of all witnesses interviewed.
The governing regulation then becomes AFR 205-57. Notify messages
addressees of change in investigative responsibility.
b. Who to Notify if Sabotage is Suspected. If, during a safety investi-
gation, evidence is discovered which suggests sabotage, immediately con-
tact the nearest AFOSI office. They will give instructions on preserving
and protecting the evidence. If requested, turn over such evidence to the
AFOSI.
3-10. INVESTIGATION/ANALYSIS. The investigator(s) document the in-
vestigation and analyze data collected from witness statements, testi-
mony, technical evaluations, and other documentary information. The
investigator(s) should descibe each area which was investigated and dis-
cuss its significance. Evidence which has little or no significance may be
discussed briefly. Areas which are very important in explaining the mis-
hap warrant extensive analysis. Investigator(s) may choose to summarize
conclusions at the end of this section before going on to the findings.
NOTE: MISHAP FACTORS are an attempt to explain why causes
(such as pilot factor, supervision, equipment failure, etc.) occurred. The
factors listed below are not mutually exclusive, but are often interrelated
and in some cases influence one another. Most mishaps involve multiple
mishap factors. To make sure the investigation considers all important
areas, use the list below. Omit those that do not apply, and add others as
necessary to analyze the mishap.
A. HUMAN FACTORS. Human factors in this context refers to any
human attributes, characteristics or limitations which in any way affects
the man-machine-mission-medium-management relationship. For con-
venience, the "man" may be analyzed in categories such as background,
motivation, selection, training, or characteristics, (physical, physiological,
psychological, perceptual, psychosocial, pathological and pharmacologi-
cal). While the implications of these may be discussed separately, for ana-
lytical purposes, it should be recognized that the human is an integrated
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whole and that his various characteristics interrelate and overlap. The
"machine" aspects may be evaluated in terms of conception, design,
fabrication, testing, modification, maintenance, handling and perform-
ance qualities, (configuration, symmetry, weight, center of gravity), cues
provided the pilot, cockpit layout, displays, lighting and the potential for
distracting/disorienting/misorienting/incapacitating the pilot. "Mission"
involves the operational aspects: what the pilot prepared, briefed, in-
tended and attempted to do with the machine. "Medium" involves the
environmental situation in which he attempted to perform the mission.
"Management" considers the supervisory aspects including ensuring
proper training pertinent to the mission, matching the man to the mission
and matching the machine to the mission.
(1) General:
(a) Background. Background may be considered a factor when a
crewmembers' upbringing failed to equip him with the fundamental at-
tributes required to function effectively in a highly technological society.
Upbringing entails morality, character, independence, ability to function
under stress, sense of responsiblity, dependability, self-discipline, etc., as
well as basic technological and communication skills.
(b) Motivation. Consider overall motivation to fly, to accom-
plish this particular mission or this particular maneuver. Motivation may
be a factor of deficiency or of excess. Under motivation may attend a
personal aversion to flying, to the aircraft, or to the mission, or it may
attend a perceived or actual reduction in mission complexity or demand,
resulting in less preparation or attention than necessary. Over-motiva-
tion, on the other hand, may be considered when a pilot is predisposed to
accomplish a given mission element successfully regardless of the situa-
tion. Mission success is afforded a higher priority than caution, judgment,
or known restrictions. Past failures often create this higher than desirable
will to succeed, especially if the failures resulted in criticism. Over-moti-
vation has also resulted in criticism. Over-motivation has also resulted
from overemphasis on competition, with the attendant underemphasis on
training.
(c) Selection. Selection may be considered a problem whenever
a pilot appears mismatched to flying or to flying the mishap type of air-
craft. Include flying history and basis for which selected or screened to fly
the mishap aircraft.
(d) Training. Training deficiencies are considered to be a factor
when a pilot/person was not trained, or was inappropriately trained to
perform the mission element being attempted. Consider the emphasis of
training[:] was precision/perfection (i.e., heads-in) emphasized over situa-
tion awareness? Did the composite instrument cross-check emphasize
progressive incorporation of the runway environment in IMC approaches
to avoid the common tendency to go visual too soon? Was there a system-
atic approach to low-level awareness training? What role did simulators
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play, if any? Consider how the training was conducted, whether the pilot
received it and whether he or she understood it. Was it provided by a
credible source? Was anyone present who may have intimidated the pilot
from asking questions of clarification, such as the ops officer or squadron
commander? Were good life saving points submerged in a plethora of
worthless information?
(2) Characteristics:
(a) Physical. Consider factors such as anthropometry (fit, reach,
see, activate), strength, stamina, endurance, height, weight, and build.
(b) Physiological. Consider factors which incapacitate, confuse,
disorient, distract or dull: hypoxia, hyperventilation, acceleration-in-
duced compromise, spatial/roll axis disorientation/misorientation, de-
compression sickness (evolved/trapped gas), hangover, menstruation.
(c) Fatigue. Fatigue comes in several forms: short term or tran-
sient/acute; cumulative; circadian rhythm phase point (time zone)
changes; phase shift (day-night work changes); or chronic. Consider im-
pact of long workdays, scheduling problems and sleeping difficulties. Fa-
tigue may be of physical, physiological or psychological origin.
Regardless of source, it produces errors of ommission or commission,
anomalies of attention, and results in increased time to perform a task.
Despite fulfilment of crew-rest requirements, fatigue may be present.
Conversely, violation of crew-rest does not automatically indicate fatigue.
Fatigue is often highly specific to the task being undertaken, some tasks
can be performed much longer than others.
(d) Physcological. Psychological characteristics or limitations re-
fers to those which are associated with the function of the human system
as a skilled or thinking entity as well as behavior under mental or emotion
stress. It involves such characteristics as basic aptitude and cognitive abil-
ities, judgment, maturity, awareness, and insight.
1. Basic aptitude and cognitive abilities includes such factors
as learning ability, intelligence, thinking ahead, switching ability, and
ability to handle multiple simultaneous inputs.
a. Learning Ability. Failure to absorb, acquire or retain in-
formation necessary to perform the mission element. This implies no defi-
ciency in the training program per se.
b. Forgetting. Forgetting is the decay process by which in-
formation once available for use has been lost. This loss may or may not
be permanent as indicated in the process of habit interference and may
reassert itself at inopportune moments.
c. Habit Interference. There are several types:
(1) Interruption. Interruption at some point of a routine
results in skipping over one or more steps of the routine without register-
ing at the conscious level. (The pilot thinks he or she has lowered the gear
but hasn't.)
(2) Continuation. Once initiated, a routine may continue
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to completion without registering at the conscious level. The pilot intends
to leave the gear down after a touch and go; but habit pattern continua-
tion, he/she unconsciously raises them. Thinking they are still down, he
or she does not bother to recheck and lands gear up.
(3) Substitution or Confusion. Having developed rou-
tines appropriate to one aircraft, the pilot inappropriately substitutes or
confuses those routines in a different aircraft. The substituted pattern
may have been developed at any time relative to that desired. It occurs in
multiple aircraft currencies as well as in similar aircraft with different
cockpit layouts in which the pilot may be unable to locate a certain
instrument.
(4) Retroactive Inhibition. An extreme form of substitu-
tion in which a supposedly longforgotten habit pattern is inserted (most
commonly during stress). An example is reaching in the wrong place for
the ejection handle.
d. Knowledge is the fund of information and skills which
the individual has accumulated. In accidents, lack of knowledge is a fre-
quent consideration. This may be due to failure to have been informed;
failure to have adequately learned; failure to be able to apply, or failure
to use because of the forgetting process.
2. Judgment. Judgment includes common sense, a logical set
of priorities, ability to tell what's important, ability to profit from mis-
takes (either own or other), appropriate planning both for routines and
contingencies, and perspective. Perspective involves appropriate objec-
tives, the "big picture", and avoidance of "mindset". Judgment also in-
volves the avoidance of doing "dumb things" that have an unwarranted
potential for damaging oneself, one's aircraft, or for that matter one's ca-
reer. Judgment also presupposes a normal survival instinct.
3. Personality. Personality involves the complex of character-
istics that distinguishes a particular individual or characterizes the indi-
vidual in his relationships with others. It includes such factors as
confidence, aggressiveness, and temperament.
a. Ego. Ego involves self-esteem, role concept (who the
crewmember thinks he or she is), pride, response to peer pressure; ten-
dency to press, prove self, show-off; fear of failure, stigma, or of looking
bad. It also involves the importance of looking good; a "macho" image, a
reputation to acquire or uphold, and self-reliance.
b. Relations with other involves factors such as maturity,
the degree of dominance, competitiveness, extroversion, leadership, com-
munication skills, concern for others, sense of humor and gregariousness.
4. Awareness. Awareness describes one's ability to acquire and
maintain situation awareness. It demands attention and implies a grasp
of the overall situation, an ability to stay on top of things, or an ability to
control the situation.
NOTE: Attention involves concentration on the appropriate things at the
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right time. Failure to appropriate attention properly is an exceptionally
important pathway in mishaps. For convenience, anomalies of attention
are subdivided as follows:
a. Distraction: Considered wherever an unplanned event
draws the victim's attention away from the task at hand. Distractions
commonly cause a reflex response.
b. Channelized Attention: Concentration on the task at
hand to the exclusion of tasks or cues of a higher priority.
c. Inattention: Failure to attend to flight related tasks for
non-flight related reasons. "Day-dreaming" and "lolly-gagging" on the
flight deck are examples.
5. Complacency. Unwarranted, uncritical satisfaction with
one's situation, often occurring when the upcoming mission element is
perceived as relatively undemanding; a relaxation of vigilance or atten-
tiveness that is inappropriate to the situation. It commonly accompanies
over-familiarity with the environment or flight regime such that the vic-
tim becomes "too comfortable". It is also seen as excessive uncritical faith
in the abilities and capabilities of another individual to whom responsibil-
ity is entrusted.
6. Task Management. The Overall ability to effectively ac-
complish the task at hand. It involves:
a. Switching ability (mental flexibility): the ability to
switch tasks efficiently and effectively without losing track; the ability to
handle multiple simultaneous inputs.
b. Prioritization: the ability to tell what's important; im-
plies knowledge and judgment.
7. Task-Saturation: inability to devote the attention required
to all the tasks being attempted or factors encountered. A common prob-
lem in high threat environment, deteriorating visibility, or multiple
emergencies.
8. Decisionmaking. Decisionmaking is the ability to select a
course of action based upon whatever information (synthesizing back-
ground, knowledge and experience) was available at the time. The deci-
sion may be incorrect though logical, illogical, impulsive, premature, ill-
considered, excessively delayed, etc.
9. Insight. Insight involves awareness of one's limitations, the
source of one's personal psychic reward, and of what makes oneself tick.
10. Affective Behavior. Affective behavior refers to emotions,
moods, and emotional states.
11. Psychomotor Complement. Psychomotor complement in-
volves coordination, inadvertent inputs, reaching for one switch and hit-
ting another, "hands", over/under controlling and controlling out of
phase (e.g., pilot induced oscillation).
(e) Perceptual. Consider the role of the sense in misinterpreting
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available cues, or the role of cues or the lack of cues in misleading or
confusing the crewmember.
1. Visual:
a. Failure to see.
b. Misinterpretation of what is seen (Illusions).
c. Misjudgments-height, distance, closure rates.
d. Distracting inputs.
e. Disorienting inputs (Vection illusion).
f. Confusing inputs.
g. Roll axis disorientation.




4. Kinesthetic - does the aircraft talk to the pilot?
(f) Psychosocial. Psychosocial considerations involve how the in-
dividual relates to others or groups.
1. On-duty relationships include the supervisory element,
peers, the unit, as well as subordinates. Other crewmembers or element-
mates influence the individual's actions as well, e.g., the flight lead.
2. Off-duty relationships include family, friends, social groups,
or acquaintances that may affect his or her behavior.
(g) Discipline. Discipline involves self-control, punctuality, plan-
ning, preparation, thoroughness, mental rehearsal, compliance with direc-
tives and maintaing an appropriate level of vigilance. Discipline is
strongly affected by the unit suprevisory element; the example set by
others in the unit (the expected behavior). Self-discipline implies aware-
ness of personal limitations and staying within these limits.
(h) Pathological. Pathological refers to disease or illness,
whether physical, mental or emotional, affecting or influencing behavior
in the mishap.
(i) Pharmacological. Any substance potentially affecting percep-
tion, balance, alertness, judgment, thinking ability or coordination; any
substance distracting or irritating the pilot may be considered here, such
as smoke and fumes.
(0) Stress. Stress is a state of disequilibrium which serves as a mo-
tivating factor with the goal a redution of stress itself. Too little stress
results in complacency with an increased probability of errors. Optimum
stress results in maximum productivity. Too much stress causes a break-
down in the system with resultant inefficiency. Stress varies from individ-
ual to individual, may be temporary or continuing process and may be
generated by a great variety of pressure in the physical, physiological or
psychological categories.
1. On-duty Stressors: Real/perceived (job promotion, flying
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upgrade, mulitple DOCs, additional duties, alerts, exercies, TDYs sched-
uling problems); interpersonal relations in unit/flight; significance of the
flight; desire to impress leading to pressing; unit stress.
2. Off-duty Stressors: Family/social; financial; political; reli-




(b) Briefings. When a mission element that should have been
briefed was not or was inadequately briefed, briefing is considered a fac-
tor. Normal tasks such as lowering the gear for landing are not consid-
ered mandatory briefing items, and briefings are not considered




(0 Required Publications (Directives):
1. Inadequate Tech Data. Mishaps involving tech data which
are clearly deficient are assigned this factor. A lack of description of gen-
erally known procedures (such as buttoning up panels when through or
using left rudder if the aircraft drifts right on landing) are not considered
inadequacies.
2. Inadequate Procedures. When the procedures for accom-
plishing a task are clearly inadequate, this factor is assigned. For exam-
ple, procedures for determining the adequacy of a strafe pit were lacking,
and the resulting increased richochet density caused a destroyed aircraft
due to 20 mm engine FOD.
3. Inadequate Directives.
4. Command and Control (Supervision). Command and con-
trol is considered a factor when supervision MAJCOM is inadequate or
when procedures over which the has control are inadequate, nonexistent,
or contradictory. Command and control deficiencies are normally char-
acterized by inadequate supervision at unit or wing level, or inadequate
mission planning or scheduling. Failure to monitor the conduct of opera-
tions or failure to provide close in-flight supervision where training or pro-




(a) Skill/Technique. Deficiencies here are considered factors
when a pilot lacks the required motor skills or uses an improper technique
(hamfisting) to perform the task attempted.
(b) Event Proficiency. Lack of event proficiency is considered a
factor when the pilot attempting the mission element has:
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1. Never done it before.
2. Done it before but not recently.
3. Done it recently for the first time. "Proficiency" and "cur-
rency" as defined by MAJCOM criteria are not necessarily synonomous.
The pilot's demonstrated abiltiy to perform the task is the governing
factor.
(c) Flying Proficiency. As opposed to event proficiency, this fac-
tor is assigned if limited recent flying time or sorties were considered to be
a factor in the mishap.
(d) Crew Rest and Crew Duty Day.
(e) Mission:
1. Pressing. A pilot who continues a maneuver or task to the
point that known parameters are exceeded is considered to be "pressing."
The decision to continue rather than abort is normally spontaneous
rather than premeditated and is generally made in the interest of mission
accomplishment. The pilot who presses "takes a chance" and places him-
self or herself in a position where increased stress often leads to task satu-
ration or channelized attention.
2. Overcommitment. When a pilot is put in a situation where
success requires that he or she exceed his or her capabilities, he or she is
considered to be "overcommitted." Overcommitment normally involves
supervisors, schedulers, or flight leaders, but it can result from a lack of
knowledge of his or her own limitations compared to mission demands or,
in some cases, from a combination of circumstances.
3. Urgent Mission. Urgent mission is considered a factor if a
pilot perceives that the overall mission is more important than a normal
training mission. This factor if often associated with actual search and
rescue and cargo resupply missions. The perception of importance often
results in overmotivation, pressing, or breakdowns in discipline.
4. Mission Stress. If the conditions surrounding a mission gen-
erate excessive stress, this is considered a factor. These conditions are
often present during deployments, check rides, exercises, and other high
visibility missions.
5. Discipline Breakdown. A discipline breakdown is consid-
ered a factor when either of two conditions exist. Lack of discipline is
evident when pilots wilfully violate known directives or restrictions. Dis-
cipline is also considered a factor when people knowlingly bend, stretch,
or ignore restrictions because they perceive tacit approval by unit supervi-
sors for the sake of mission accomplishment. However admirable their
motives might be and however slightly the limits might be exceeded, fail-








(c) Communications and navigational Aids.
(d) Medical.
(e) Manning (unit).
(f) Equipment Malfunction in flight. This factor is used to iso-
late the occasions when an aircraft failure or malfunction, rather than a
mission element, caused the pilot to be distracted or otherwise fail to ac-







C. UNIT MAINTENANCE FACTORS:
(1) Maintenance Personnel Qualifications:
(a) Inadequate Training. When a person was not trained or was
inadequately trained to perform the task(s) or procedures(s) being at-
temtped. Training deficiencies should be identified in two categories:
(1) resident-tech school or FTD (2) OJT (CAMT, AMQP, etc.).
(b) Inexperienced Worker. If the person performing task(s) re-
lated to the mishap does not have adequate background or experience on
the weapon system or substytem. Consider the individual's amount of
time on the mishap weapon system when making this determination
(a) less than 1 year (b) 1 to 3 years (c) more than 3 years. For example, a
specialist with less than 1 year experience or someone recently crossflowed
from a different weapon system would not be experienced. Generally, less
than 2 years on a weapon system is not considered experienced.
(c) Inadequate Learning Ability. When a person was exposed to
the information needed to perform a task but did not absorb it. This
implies no deficiency in training but rather one of the individual's learn-
ing ability.
(d) Lack of Task Proficiency. If limited recent performance of a
particular job is considered to be a factor. This factor occurs on jobs that
are not done frequently enough to stay proficient.
(2) Miscellaneous Human Factors:
(a) Excessive Personal (Mental) Stress. If a person has unusual
or severe personal problems such as family problems, financial problems,
etc., which cause worry or concern. It may be difficult to assess the extent
to which these problems might influence performance.
(b) Physical Fatigue. If a person is truly fatigued, this may result
from overtime (consistent 12 hour shifts, frequent extended 6 to 7 day
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work weeks, lack of rest, part-time jobs, TDY, frequent shift changes,
etc.).
(c) Distraction. If a person's attention is drawn away from the
task at hand by an outside factor. This normally occurs during shift
changes, being pulled off the job for other priority, emergency, horseplay,
etc.
(d) Channelized Attention. When a person concentrates on the
task at hand to the point that other problems or hazards are not noticed.
This tends to occur while performing tasks that require extreme concen-
tration or have an established habit pattern such as engine start, launches,
end of runway checks, etc.
(e) Task Saturation. When a person cannot give the required
attention to all of the multiple tasks being attempted with the fac-
tors/conditions being encountered. This usually occurs during pressure
situations such as the "red ball" repair to prevent a ground abort. It also
can occur when a person is not well trained or attempts numerous tasks
under pressure.
(0 Complacency. A factor when the awareness of actual hazards
is relaxed due to familiarity with the equipment or environment. This
often occurs after numerous repetitions of a task to the point that the
worker becomes "excessively comfortable". It may also be induced by
overconfidence in the abilities of other workers. This can happen to
either experienced or inexperienced workers.
(g) Habit Pattern Deviation. When an individual does not fol-
low normal habit patterns. The most common type or error involves for-
getting to do part or a routine task. It also involves a reversion to habits
learned previously and no longer appropriate.
(h) Overconfidence. When personnel demonstrate excessive con-
fidence in their ability to perform tasks. Often demonstrated by strong,
reliable workers, this factor is often augmented by supervisory deficien-
cies, lack of discipline and/or mission pressure.
(3) Mission Pressure. If the conditions involved in completing a
maintenance task(s) cause excessive pressure (actual or perceived). These
conditions are often present during exercises, sortie surges, deployments,
heavy flying schedules, etc.
(4) Unit Manning. If there are not enough personnel assigned to
the mishap unit (below authorized manning, etc.) to accomplish unit mis-
sion tasking. Also a factor if unit manning is full, but critical skills or
experience are lacking.
(5) Supervision:
(a) Workcenter Supervision-when supervision is inadequate.
These deficiencies are characterized by failure to monitor maintenance
operations, provide close supervision, or written/oral guidance as
required.
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(b) Squadron Supervision-Same as above except at squadron
level.
(c) Wing Supervision-Same as above except at wing level.
(d) MAJCOM Supervision-Same as above except at MAJCOM
level.
(e) Inexperienced Supervision. When supervision is inadequate
because of inexperience on the specific aircraft. This concerns technical
aircraft expertise. Less than 2 years may be considered inexperienced, but
total overall background should also be considered.
(6) Discipline Breakdown-When either a person wilfully violates
known directives or when they knowingly bend, stretch, or ignore direc-
tives. Examples are shortcuts, workarounds. Breakdown may be imposed
by unit mission pressure.
(7) Tech Data-When tech data is clearly deficient. A lack of
description of generally known procedures (such as buttoning up panels
when job completed) is not considered reason for using this factor.
(8) Procedures:
(a) Inadequate Procedures-When the procedures for accomplish-
ing a task(s) are clearly inadequate.
(b) Nonexistent Procedures-When procedures do not exist.
(c) Multiple Procedures-When procedures to accomplish a task
are dispersed to numerous sources (local checklists, MOIs, SOIs, etc.) and
adversely impact the ability of the technician to efficiently accomplish the
task without missing a step.
(9) Field Quality Control/Assurance-When actions by the field
level quality function were inadequate or inappropriate (usually involves
inadequate quality inspection or sampling).
(10) Time of Day. Provide the day and approximate time the tasks
which may have contributed were performed. This may have been sev-
eral days before the mishap.
(11) Weather conditions. Provide the existing weather conditions
at the time the task was performed. Include temperature, wind, chill fac-
tor, precipitation, darkness, etc.
(12) Field Working Conditions. Conditions which caused excessive
difficulty in completing the task(s) or doing the work properly. Examples
are inadequate lighting, tools, facilities, personnel, noise, etc.
D. LOGISTICS (DEPOT/AcQUISTION). Factors identified which are
the responsibility of either the depot or acquisition process need to be
separated from those at unit level. Many of the unit level definitions also
apply at the depot/acquisition level. When this occurs, it must be clearly
assigned to the correct source to allow correct identification of the prob-
lem. The following are depot and acquisition peculiar factors:
(1) Depot Quality Assurance. When actions by the depot level
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quality function were inadequate or inappropriate (usually results from
inadequate inspection or sampling).
(2) Design Deficiency. If aircraft systems or components are inade-
quately designed and the system or component contributed to the
mishap.
(3) Management Action. When a corrective action for a known
deficency was delayed or not completed as a result of lack of action by
logistics management.
(4) Faulty Overhaul Workmanship Quality. Used to identify over-
haul quality problems, including faulty work., inadequate inspec-
tion/procedures, or the use of faulty parts.
(5) Modification Philosophy/Policy. Similar to "acquisition philos-
ophy/policy" except that modification rather than acquisition problems
are identified. Deficiencies in modification classification, prioritization,
funding, or scheduling are examples of this factor.
(6) Acquisition Philosophy/Policy. When during acquisition,
equipment was acquired with known design deficiencies or the supplier
was unable to meet specifications or supply requirements.
(7) Attrition Replacement. When a decision to replace known defi-
cient parts by attrition rather than by time compliance technical order
directed time change or replacement results in further mishaps.
(8) Corrective Action Underway. When corrective action has been
initiated to correct a known deficiency but the mishap aircraft has not
been modified and others of the same MDS have. The corrective action
was not timely enough to prevent further mishaps.
(9) Inadequate Corrective Action. When corrective action has
been completed but was not adequate to solve the problem. Examples
are TCTOs that only fixed part of a problem or created other problems.
(10) No Corrective Action Taken. When no corrective action has
been taken to fix an identified deficiency (usually considered an isolated
occurrence) and subsequent mishaps occur from the same problem.
(11) Depot Working Condition. Conditions under which individ-
ual(s) work which cause excessive difficulty in completing work or doing
work properly. Examples are extreme climatic conditions, extreme noise
or other environmental conditions.
3-11. FINDINGS, CAUSES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. The most impor-
tant part of mishap investigation is developing findings, causes, and rec-
ommendations. The goal is to decide on the best preventive actions to
preclude mishap recurrence. To accomplish this purpose, the investiga-
tor(s) must list the significant events and circumstances of the mishap se-
quence (findings). Then they must select from among these the events
and conditions that were causal (causes). Finally, they suggest courses of
action to prevent recurrence (recommendations).
3-12. FINDINGS:
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A. DEFINITION. The findings are the conclusions of the board. They
are based on the weight of evidence, the board's professional knowledge,
and its best judgment. They are statements of significant events or condi-
tions leading to the mishap. They are arranged in the order in which they
occurred. Though each finding is an essential step in the mishap se-
quence, each is not necessarily a cause factor. (See the examples in para-
graph 3-15.)
B. DETERMINATION:
(1) Deciding on findings means isolating each significant event or
condition which sustained the sequence leading to the mishap. These
findings must then be listed in the order in which they occurred. In some
cases (see examples 5 and 6) the sequence starts well before the mishap
itself. In all cases, the sequence must be carried through the point where
all damage or injury has occurred. The mishap may result in an escape,
survival, or rescue which is not directly related to the mishap itself. If
deficiency led to injury (major/minor) or death list these events as a sepa-
rate sequence of findings (causes) under the heading of Life Sciences
Findings (see example 6).
(2) Each finding must be a clear statement on a single event or
condition. Do not include cause and effect in the same finding. Number
the findings consecutively. Each number should be preceded by the word
"Finding" (such as Finding 1, Finding 2, and so on). Samples of findings
for various types of mishaps are listed in paragraph 3-15. Do not include
the names of persons in statements of findings. Supporting evidence need
not be included in the finding because the board has already documented
it in the analysis. However, each finding must have a logical connection
to the other findings. This is, in fact, a good way to test findings. If there
is no logical relationship with other findings, then the sequence of the
mishap has not been correctly described. For example, the board might
find that a pilot was not qualified to fly that plane on that mission. This
might be a finding if the board could show a logical connection between
that condition and those that followed. On the other hand, the board
might determine that the pilot was qualified to fly. That determination
might be equally important to the investigation, but it would not be listed
as a finding. The board could not show a logical connection between that
condition and those that followed.
(3) There will be cases where the board cannot pinpoint a particu-
lar event in a sequence. Even knowing the event, sometimes the board
cannot find why it happened. Here, the board must keep in mind that is
is not yet dealing with cause factors. Some latitude in stating sequential
findings is permissable. List as much of the sequence as you can support.
Then state what part of it is undetermined. (See flight mishap examples 7
and 8.) Where there are supportable alternatives, identify them as such
and list them in sequence. Show these as subordinate to the finding(s) to
which they apply. Do not list all of the possible alternatives that could
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have existed merely because they cannot be conclusively eliminated. This
sort of conjecture may be all right in the analysis section. However, the
findings should contain a reasonable measure of probability based on evi-
dence, professional knowledge, and good judgment.
3-13. CAUSES:
A. DEFINITION. Causes are those findings which, singly or in combi-
nation with other causes, resulted in the damage or injury that occurred.
A cause is a deficiency the correction, elimination, or avoidance of which
would likely have prevented or mitigated the mishap damage or signifi-
cant injuries. A cause is an act, an omission, a condition, or a circum-
stance, and it either starts or sustains the mishap sequence. A cause may
be an element of human or mechanical performance. An environmental
condition may be a cause if it was not reasonably avoidable. Findings
which sustained the mishap sequence, but which were normal to the situ-
ation as it developed, are not causes. (See examples 3, 4, and 5 below.)
These are often the unavoidable effects of a preceding cause. Apply the
"reasonable person" concept when determining the causes. If a person's
performance was reasonable, considering the mishap circumstances, do
not assign cause. It is not appropriate to expect extraordinary or uniquely
superior performance in activities.
B. DETERMINATION. After the board has listed its findings, it should
choose those findings which are causes. These are identified by adding
the word (CAUSE) to the finding. It is not necessary to list the causes
under a separate heading. Not every event in a properly devloped se-
quence is causal. Some are really effects or results, even though their in-
clusion in the sequence is material to the mishap. If, for example, an
engine flames out because a fuel pump fails, concern is rightfully with the
fuel pump. If the fuel pump has failed, the engine failure is a normal
result and not causal. In a different sequence, perhaps the pump failure
would, itself, be the result of some earlier cause. An environmental condi-
tion, such as birdstrike, lightning, high wind, or flood, could be a cause if
it was unavoidable. (See flight mishap example 4.) In most cases, mis-
haps will have several causes which acted in combination to produce
damage and injury. Do not assign priorities to the caues with such terms
as "primary," "contributing," "main," "most important." The wording
of a cause should be a clear and simple statement of a single condition or
an event. After final determination of cause is made, the Directorate of
Aerospace Safety assigns the causes to cause factor categories. These are
in the letter of final evaluation.
3-14. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. DEFINITION. The recommendations are actions which will likely
prevent a similar mishap or reduce its effects. The recommendations
must be feasible and related to the causes of the mishap or the significant
injuries. Actions not related to the causes of mishaps or fa-
tal/major/minor injuries should be handled per paragraph 12-14. Do not
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identify the causes(s) which generated each recommendation. Every
cause need not have a related recommendation.
B. DETERMINATION. Recommendations may vary in scope. Some
actions can be taken at unit level. Other recommendations need actions
by MAJCOMs or other agencies. List the recommendations as a separate
major topic immediately following the findings. The recommendations
are numbered consecutively. Do not use more than one set of recommen-
dations. Recommendations to prevent mishaps and injuries are inlcuded
in one set of recommendations. Each number is preceded by the word
"Recommendation" (such as Recommendation 1, Recommendation 2).
Include only one recommendation in each statement. If a separate rec-
ommendation is needed, use another number rather than a subgrouping
such as la, ib, and so forth. Be sure to identify the correct action agen-
cies. Do not list the Directorate of Aerospace Safety or Nuclear Surety as
an action agency in lieu of appropriate organizations that manage or con-
trol the resources involved. Recommendations to brief selected groups of
personnel on the mishap are also unnecessary. Doing so is a basic comand
responsibility. Recommendations must also allow for definitive closing
action. It is not appropriate to include sweeping or general recommenda-
tions which cannot be closed by the action agency. Likewise, vague rec-
ommendations which address the importance of simply doing one's job
properly are inappropriate. Sometimes, the action to be taken depends
on tests or analyses which are incomplete when the report is sent in. If so,
explain this and give a reference which will permit future correlation.
c. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO PUBLICATIONS. Fre-
quently, mishap investigations result in recommendations for changes to
Technical Orders of Flight Manuals/Check-lists. When this happens, the
investigator(s) must sumbit, through channels, appropriate AFTO Forms
22 (see TO 00-5-1) or AF Forms 847. Recommendations for flight man-
ual/checklist changes (AF Forms 847) should be submitted IAW the
Emergency Critical Safety Hazard procedures contained in AFR 60-9. In
all cases, ensure that the reason for recommended change section of
AFTO Form 22 or AF Form 847 is sanitized according to paragraph 1-9h.
3-15. EXAMPLES OF FINDINGS:
A. FLIGHT MISHAPS. Examples of flight mishap findings are listed be-
low. Causes have been identified only to illustrate how they are to be
shown in the report. They are not to serve as examples of causes. See
paragraph 3-13 for definition and determination of causes.
(1) Example 1:
(a) Findings:
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) Shortly after takeoff, No. 1 engine fire
warning light came on for an undetermined reason.
2. Finding 2. The pilot shut down No. 1 engine and started an
immediate recovery.
870 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
3. Finding 3. (CAUSE) On final approach, the pilot allowed
the airspeed to become excessively low.
4. Finding 4. The aircraft touched down in the overrun at an
excessive sink rate.
5. Finding 5. The left main gear sheared due to overload, and
the aircraft sustained major damage.
6. Finding 6. The pilot evacuated the plane without injury.
(b) Comment: The fire warning light resulted in the single-en-
gine approach and can be considered a cause factor. Finding 3 was
clearly a cause, while Finding 4 and 5 are effects or results and not causes.
(2) Example 2:
(a) Findings:
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) Number 3 and 4, while attempting to
rejoin the lead elements, failed to visually acquire each other.
2. Finding 2. The aircraft collided and went out of control.
3. Finding 3. Both pilots ejected successfully, and neither was
injured.




1. Finding 1. Enroute winds were forecast to have a 50-knot
headwind component.
2. Finding 2. En route, the pilot enountered 100-knot
headwinds.
3. Finding 3. (CAUSE) The pilot decided to continue his or
her cross-country fight, overflying several bases which were weather-free
and operational.
4. Finding 4. Five miles short of destination, the aircraft
flamed out due to fuel exhaustion.
5. Finding 5. The pilot ejected successfully.
6. Finding 6. The aircraft was destroyed.
(b) Comment. In this sequence, a weather problem existed, but
it did not cause the pilot to continue the flight until flameout. Under
different circumstances (over ocean and committed to continue), both the
forecast and the headwinds encountered might be causes.
(4) Example 4:
(a) Findings:
1. Finding 1. The route weather forecast was for clouds from
10,000 to 30,000 feet. Thunderstorms, hail, or turbulence were not
forecast.
2. Finding 2. (CAUSE) While flying in the weather at 27,000
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feet, the aircraft encountered moderate hail and suffered substantial
damage.
(b) Comment. This assumes that the hail was not forecastable.
(5) Example 5:
(a) Findings:
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) Maintenance records did not identify
the requirement to time-change the MLG rod attach pin, and it was con-
tinued in service too long.
2. Finding 2. The pin failed on takeoff due to excessive wear.
3. Finding 3. Due to failure of the pin, the right MLG
collapsed.
4. Finding 4. Without the right MLG wheel, directional con-
trol was lost and the aircraft departed the runway.
5. Finding 5. (CAUSE) The aircraft struck a nonfrangible
runway distance marker which ruptured a fuel cell.
6. Finding 6. Fuel from the ruptured cell was ignited and the
aircraft caught fire.
7. Finding 7. After the aircraft stopped, the flightcrew
egressed without injury.
8. Finding 8. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.
(b) Comment. In this case, Finding 2, 3, and 4 are results of
leaving a MLG pin in service until it wore out. Finding 5 is harder to see.
Runway markers are supposed to be frangible so that they can be hit
without too much damage. This one was not, therefore, a cause of the
total damage. In other cirumstances, the aircraft might leave the runway
and hit another kind of obstruction (RSU unit, perimeter fence). Here,
damage might be considered the expected result of leaving the runway
under such condition. In those cases, the obstruction would not be causal.
(6) Example 6:
(a) Findings. (Mishap Sequence:)
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) At depot overhaul, a pair of pliers was
left inside an aircraft bulkhead in the vicinity of station 620.
2. Finding 2. (CAUSE) During inspection of work performed
at overhaul, the pliers were not discovered.
3. Finding 3. During an ACM mission 45 hours after over-
haul, the pliers jammed the stabilator control preventing stabilator
movement.
4. Finding 4. The aircraft departed controlled flight and the
crew ejected.
5. Finding 5. The aircraft was destroyed.
(b) Findings. (Life Sciences Sequence No. 1:)
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) At some unknown time, a zero delay
initiator was installed in the front seat instead of a 1-second delay
initiator.
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2. Finding 2. The front seat pilot ejected during uncontrolled
flight at low altitude.
3. Finding 3. The pilot separated from the seat prematurely,
resulting in the pilot's parachute becoming entangled with the ejection
seat.
4. Finding 4. The pilot was fatally injured on ground contact.
(c) Findings. (Life Sciences Sequence No.2:)
1. Finding 1. The rear seat pilot ejected during uncontrolled
flight at low attitude.
2. Finding 2. (CAUSE) All egress mechanisms functioned cor-
rectly, but the rear seat pilot fractured his leg during landing on rocky
terrain.




1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) The outboard torque tube chain
failed for undetermined reason.
a. The chain failure could have resulted from failure to rein-
stall cotter keys during inspection.
b. The chain failure could have resulted from materiel fail-
ure of one of the unrecovered chain links.
2. Finding 2. As a result of the chain failure, flap retraction
was asymmetric.
3. Finding 3. (CAUSE) The pilot let asymmetric retraction
continue without determining the extent of the malfunction.
4. Finding 4. Continued asymmetric retraction resulted in mi-
nor damage to the aircraft.
(b) Comment. Finding 1 has an undetermined aspect. Findings
la and lb are probably supported in the narrative, but not conclusively.
Finding 2 is a result, not a cause. Finding 3 is a cause because the pilot
knew of the asymmetric retraction and did not stop it. Finding 4 is an
expected result of letting the asymmetric retraction continue.
(8) Example 8:
(a) Findings:
1. Finding 1. (CAUSE) The pilot elected to take off in an air-
craft with a known engine discrepancy-low EPR.
2. Finding 2. (CAUSE) The N-i compressor failed for unde-
termined reasons causing catastrophic internal damage and loss of thrust.
a. The N-1 compressor failure could have been caused by a
fifth or sixth state blade lock failure brought on by corrosion.
b. The N-i compressor failure could have been caused by a
fifth or sixth state blade failure brought on by corrosion.
3. Finding 3. The pilot ejected successfully.
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4. Finding 4. The aircraft was destroyed.
(b) Comment. Self-explanatory.
B. MISSILE MISHAPS. An example of missile findings is listed below.
Causes have been identified to illustrate how they are to be shown in the
report. They are not to serve as examples of causes.
(1) Finding 1. (CAUSE) The team chief of electromechanical team
1 failed to properly document site configuration on pertinent AFTO
forms.
(2) Finding 2. (CAUSE) the team chief of electromechanical team
2 failed to make sure that the missile guidance set (M[GS]) unbilical cool-
ant lines were connected to the MGS prior to MGS startup. This is re-
quired by TO 21M-LGM30XXX.
(3) Finding 3. The epoxy seal of the computer cold plate become
unbonded due to excessive heat from MGS operation without coolant.
(4) Finding 4. The missile, MGS, and propulsion system rocket en-
gine were damaged by sodium chromate solution (coolant). This had
leaked from the computer cold plate following MGS operation after cool-
ant lines had been attached.
c. GROUND MISHAPS. Three examples of suggested ground mishap
findings are shown below:
(1) Example 1:
(a) Finding 1. A qualified crane crew was assigned to erect sev-
eral poles to be used as temporary antennas.
(b) Finding 2. (CAUSE) the supervisor failed to analyze the job
site for potential hazards, and, as a result, overlooked a high-voltage
power line in the work area.
(c) Finding 3. (CAUSE) While erecting one of the poles, the
crane opertor struck a high-voltage overhead power line with the crane
boom.
(d) Finding 4. A crewmember handling a guide cable line, was
electrocuted when current flowed through the guide cable to the ground.
(2) Example 2: (a) Finding 1. An AFMV driver and assis-
tant were assigned to deliver high priority items to "X" AFB 6 hours dis-
tant. They were directed by their supervisor to remain overnight for crew
rest.
(b) Finding 2. (CAUSE) After delivery, the driver decided to re-
turn to Home AFB, although they had been on duty for 10 hours.
(c) Finding 3. During the return to home base, the vehicle oper-
ator was traveling 20 MPH over the posted speed limit.
(d) Finding 4. (CAUSE) Because of the self-extended work pe-
riod, the assistant was sleeping and the driver fell asleep at the wheel.
(e) Finding 5. The vehicle departed the highway and rolled
over, fatally injuring both occupants.
(3) Example 3:
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(a) Finding 1. (CAUSE) A scheduled NDI inspection was not
performed on a rotary lawn mower allowing a damaged blade to go
undetected.
(b) Finding 2. Two airmen were dispatched with the defective
mower to mow high grass on a field.
(c) Finding 3. (CAUSE) The airman in charge failed to inspect
the area to be mowed for hazards.
(d) Finding 4. During the mowing operation, the mower struck
a large rock and the damaged blade failed.
(e) Finding 5. The failed blade struck the assisting airman in the
head inflicting fatal injuries.
D. SPACE MISHAPS. An example of space mishap findings is listed
below. Causes have been identified to illustrate how they are to be shown
in the report. They are not to serve as examples of causes.
(1) Finding 1. (CAUSE) Design criteria for refilling the reusable
solid rocket motors do not require verification of motor case structual in-
tegrity subsequent to the last cleaning action and prior to reloading.
(2) Finding 2. Hydrostatic testing at 1.2 times the normal operat-
ing pressure, conducted prior to cleaning, did not reveal any defects in the
rocket motor casing.
(3) Finding 3. (CAUSE) Undetected erosion of motor casing mate-
rial during cleaning resulted in an excessively thin area in the forwarded
dome of the motor casing.
CHAPTER 5
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORTING
5-1. GENERAL INFORMATION. Mishaps are categorized as aircraft flight
mishaps based on the mode of operation at the time of occurrence. The
term includes mishaps that occur during all aircraft operations when "in-
tent for flight" exists (paragraph 5-2c). Flight mishaps are classified as
explained in paragraph 2-4, according to the severity of the resulting in-
jury, occupational illness, damage, or mishap potential.
5-2. TERMS EXPLAINED:
A. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT:
(1) This term means all manned vehicles that are supported in
flight by buoyancy or dynamic action (including manned aircraft RPVs).
It includes those that are owned or leased by the US Air Force, US Air
Force Reserve, or Air National Guard of the US and are:
(a) Operated and exclusively controlled or directed by the US
Air Force; or
(b) Furnished by the Air Force (GFP), or leased, to a non-Air
Force organization when the Government has assumed ground and flight
risk; or
1984] MILITARY ACCIDENT REPORTS 875
(c) Assigned for the use of an Air Force liason officer with Civil
Air Patrol.
(2) The term also includes any aircraft that are under test by the
Air Force, including aircraft furnished by a contractor when operated by
an Air Force aircrew.
(3) The term does not include aircraft that are:
(a) Leased (except as stated above) to contractors, commercial
airlines, or foreign governments when the lessee has assumed risk of loss;
(b) Loaned to other government agencies;
(c) Civil air carrier aircraft owned by civil operators and flying
contractor air missions for the Air Force;
(d) Factory-new production aircraft not formally accepted by the
Air Force (see paragraph 1-50;
(e) Air Force aircraft assigned to the Civil Air Patrol;
(f) Aircraft of other military services, even when they are taking
part in a joint air operation controlled by the Air Force;
(g) Air Force aero club aircraft.
B. MISHAPS WHICH ARE REPORTABLE DUE TO MISHAP POTENTIAL.
Some events are reported as flight mishaps, even though they did not re-
sult in damage or reportable injury. They are reported because they have
significant mishap potential. These reports are used in developing and
taking preventive actions before they produce more serious results. These
mishaps include high accident potential (HAP) mishaps (paragraph 5-40,
certain engine malfunctions (paragraph 5-4g(1)), and physiological epi-
sodes (paragraph 5- 4 g(2)).
C. INTENT FOR FLIGHT. This condition is necessary for a mishap to
be reported as a flight mishap. It exists when an Air Force aircraft engine
is started for the purpose of commencing authorized flight. Intent for
flight continues until the aircraft comes to rest with the engine(s), propel-
ler(s) or rotors stopped and brakes set or wheel chocks in place. An air-
craft's engine is started when a intentional attempt is made to set the
engine in motion. The power source may be either internal or external to
the aircraft. For amphibian aircraft landing on the water, intent for flight
continues until all normal flight operations have ended. It ceases when
the engines have been stopped and the aircraft has been either moored or
taken in tow.
5-3. CLASSIFYING AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAPS. Mishap classification is
based, in part, on the costs of damage to Air Force and non-Air Force
equipment and property. Early determination of these costs is needed to
classify, investigate, and report the mishap. As soon as possible, the inve-
tigating commander needs an estimate of all damages. This estimate is
used to classify the mishap and convene the right kind of investigation.
These early estimates may be adjusted later to reflect a more systematic
evaluation conducted during the investigation. However, a fairly accu-
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rate classification can usually be made when first surveying the damage.
See paragraph 2-5 for instructions on determining mishap costs.
5-4. FLIGHT MISHAP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
A. FORMAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS A FLIGHT MISHAPS.
These mishaps normally require formal reports, as well as message reports
(see c below for a specific exception). Large-scale board investigations
almost always call for formal reports. The Director of Aerospace Safety
may decide in some cases that a formal report is not needed (paragraph 4-
3b tells how to request a waiver).
B. FORMAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS B FLIGHT MISHAPS.
Class B flight mishaps require formal reports as well as message reports if
the investigation is complex. The Director of Aerospace Safety may de-
termine in some cases that a formal report is not needed. See paragraph
4-3b for waiver instructions.
C. FORMAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS A OR B MISHAPS
INVOLVING ONLY ENGINE DAMAGE. Class A or B mishaps which are so
classified because of engine FOD (including bird ingestion) do not require
formal reports. This exemption does not apply if a fatality or permanent
disability results, or if damage is not limited to the engine(s). Under this
exemption, reporting requirements are the same as for Class C mishaps.
Command indorsements are not required. A letter of final evaluation will
not be prepared on these mishaps.
D. FORMAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS A AND B FLIGHT
MISHAPS WHEN THE AIRCRAFT Is NOT DAMAGED. Although mishaps
are classified according to severity of damage, injury, or occupational ill-
ness, the reporting requirements are based on other factors. The follow-
ing instructions discuss these special cases:
(1) Mishaps Occurring During Air Drop Operations:
(a) Parachuting Injuries. Such injuries ot Air Force personnel
while performing official duties are ground mishaps. Refer to chapter 6
for investigation and reporting requirements. Injuries to other military
service personnel during parachute jumps from Air Force aircraft are re-
ported by the other services. An exception would be if the injured persons
are permanently assigned to an Air Force unit. The Air Force takes part
in these investigations when requested by the other service. This may
occur if Air Force equipment or techniques are involved.
(b) Air Force equipment damages as a result of being airdropped
is categorized as a ground mishap. Damage to airdropped equipment be-
longing to other services is reportable by the service experiencing the loss.
The Air Force takes part in these investigations when requested by the
other service.
(c) Injury or damage may occur to persons or property on the
ground because an airdropped load impacted off the drop zone. This is
categorized as a flight mishap. The following reports are required:
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1. Message reports: Preliminary and final progress reports
only.
2. Formal report: As called for in (2)(b) below.
(2) Fatalities or reportable injuries as a result of being struck by an
aircraft (with intent for flight). This includes being struck by an object
dropped from or propelled by an aircraft.
(a) Message reports: Preliminary and final progress report only.
(b) Formal reports: An abbreviated formal report consisting of
at least the following:
1. AF Form 711.
2. AF Form 71 lb, Aircraft Flight Mishap Report.
3. AF From 71 1c, if maintenance, materiel, or design defi-
ciency was a cause.
4. AF Form 711 gA, Life Sciences Report of an Individual in-
volved in an AF Accident/Incident Section A, Aircraft Acci-
dent/Incident, for:
a. Aircrew member(s) assessed as a cause of the mishap.
b. Air Force individual sustaining the injury.
5. Narrative of investigation/analysis, findings, and
recommendations.
6. AF Form 71 lh, USAF Mishap Report Checklist and Index.
NOTE: This report is submitted in the two-part format.
(3) Fatal or other reportable injury or illness to an occupant of an
Air Force aircraft from any cause. Submit the reports as in (2) above.
(4) Property damage resulting from an Air Force aircraft operation
when there is no reportable damage to the aircraft.
(a) Message reports. Standard message reports for damage in ex-
cess of $100,000 or when fatality or permanent disability occurs. Prelimi-
nary and final progress report only (or preliminary/final report) for lesser
damage or injury.
(b) Formal Report. If damage is $100,000 or more, an abbrevi-
ated formal report, consisting, as a minimum, of the following:
1. AF Form 711.
2. AFForm 71lb.
3. AF Form 71 1c, if maintenance, materiel, or design defi-
ciency is a cause.
4. AF Form 71 IgA for aircrew member(s) assessed as a cause of
the mishap.
5. Narrative of investigation/analysis, findings, and
recommendations.
6. Statement of damage to private property, if applicable.
7. AFForm 711h.
NOTE: This report is submitted in the two-part format.
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E. NTSB REPORTS OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING AIR FORCE AIR-
CRAFT. The Director of Aerospace Safety Decides if the Air Force will
take part in the NTSB investigation. The investigating major com-
mander is normally required to conduct a separate investigation of the
mishap. However, this may. be waived, based on mutual agreement be-
tween the major commander and Director of Aerospace Safety. The deci-
sion will be made if it is found that the NTSB report is adequate for Air
Force purposes.
F. FLIGHT HAP MISHAPS. Report HAP mishaps according to para-
graph 4-3d. Submit fight HAP mishap messages as preliminary reports,
followed by one or more progress reports. The investigating commander
or higher authority may decide that a formal report is also required. The
action ALC, or other agency with engineering responsibility, sends HQ
AFISC/SER a copy of each TDR. This copy should include all support-
ing documents such as metallurgical analyses, photographs, test reports,
and the like. The types of events designated flight HAP mishaps are:
(1) Loss of thrust sufficient to preclude maintaining level flight at a
safe altitude.
(2) Engine case penetration by shrapnel from internal engine com-
ponent failure.
(3) Engine case rupture or burn-through, engine bay fire, or mas-
sive fuel leakage.
(4) Emergency landing of a single engine aircraft with imminent
engine failure confirmed after landing. (Includes precautionary landing
by helicopter with imminent engine or rotor drive system failure con-
firmed after landing.)
(5) Unselected propeller or thrust reversal.
(6) Flight control malfunction (including helicopter flight control,
stability augmenter, autopilot, and trim systems) resulting in an unex-
pected, hazardous change of flight attitude, altitude, or heading.
(7) Spillage or leakage of radioactive, toxic, corrosive, or flammable
material from aircraft stores or cargo, that in the judgment of the report-
ing official, is a significant hazard to the crew/passengers or aircraft. Base
this judgment on whether a similar event could result in serious injury,
illness, or damage. In item 9 of the mishap message, identify which
agency or unit prepared the shipment. Also, if cargo is shipped under a
waiver, tell which agency (MAJCOM, NAF, etc.) granted the waiver.
(8) In-flight loss of all pitot-static instrument indications or all
gyro-stablized attitude indications.
(9) Any other event which, in the judgment of the reporting offi-
cial, is a significant hazard to the crew or aircraft. Base this judgment on
whether a similar event could result in serious injury, illness, or damage.
This includes emergency conditions arising from aircraft operation, or
from the failure or malfunction of systems or components that are essen-
tial to safe flight.
1984] MILITARY ACCIDENT REPORTS 879
G. OTHER EVENTS REPORTABLE AS CLASS C MISHAP. Certain other
events are reporable as Class C mishaps even though they may not meet
the damage, injury, or illness criteria for Class C. Do not include damage
costs in reports of these mishaps, unless reportable damage, as defined in
paragraph 5-2b, occurs.
(1) Any flameout, engine failure, or required engine shutdown with
intent for flight is reported as a Class C mishap under the following
conditions:
(a) For single- and twin-engine aircraft, report all such events.
(b) For aircraft with three or more engines, report only those
events involving two or more engines.
NOTE: For B-52 aircraft the shutdown of two engines in the same pod is
considered a single engine shutdown when the second engine has no dam-
age or mechanical malfunction and the reason for shutdown is purely
precautionary.
(c) Intentional shutdown for training, FCF, or other nonemer-
gency purposes are not reported. Failure to restart is reported using the
above criteria.
(2) A Physiological Episode. A physiological reaction, near acci-
dent, or hazard in flight due to medical or physiological reasons. Physio-
logical episodes are reported as Class C Mishaps, even though they may
not meet the damage, injury, or illness criteria. Except as noted, report
on all involved-both crew and passengers unless passenger is a patient
experiencing a consequence of his or her informity. Physiological episodes
are in-flight events of a physical, physiological, medical, pathological, psy-
chological, pharmacological, or toxicological nature which compromise
performance, confuse, disorient, dull, distract, pain, endanger or incapaci-
tate. As a minimum these include:
(a) Hypoxia-Suspected or proven.
(b) Hyperventilation-Crew only.
(c) Decompression sickness, from evolved gas (skin, manifesta-
tions, bends, chokes, neurological or neurocirculatory involvement).
(d) Mechanical effects of trapped gas (Barotitus, Barosinusitis,
Barodontalgia, Abdominal pain if un-relieved).
(e) Unintentitional explosive or rapid decompression which ex-
poses personnel to cabin altitude above FL 250, regardless of whether de-
compression sickness or Hypoxia occurs.
(f) Spatial Disorientation, Vertigo, Visual Illusions, or Distrac-
tion resulting in an unusual attitude-crew only.
(g) Loss of Consciousness from any cause.
(h) Exposure to toxic, noxious or irritating materials, such as
smoke, fumes; or liquids.
(i) Carbon Monoxide poisoning.
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(j) Illness, (both acute and pre-existing) including food poison-
ing: Dehydration; Mycardial infarction, Seizure, etc.
(k) Drugs (legal and illicit, prescribed or nonprescribed) crew
only, unless waivered by proper authority and no factor in incident.
(1) Alcohol and hangover. Crew only.
(m) Occupational illness resulting in lost workday. Crew only.
(n) Injury exceeding criteria of minimal.
(o) Extreme heat or cold.
(p) Any ejection or extraction from an aircraft, not otherwise
reportable.
(q) Death.
(r) Any other episode considered appropriate by the flight sur-
geon or flying safety officer.
If unsure whether the factors or reactions consitute a Physiological Epi-
sode, contact HQ AFISC/SEL, AV 876-3458 or HQ AFMSC/SGPA, AV
240-2034 for assistance and clarification.
(3) Physiological episodes reported according to (2) above also re-
quire sending AF Forms 71 lqA. Refer to paragraph 11-3a(2), 11-4c, and
table 12-1 line 17.
H. SPECIAL F-15 ENGINE STALL/STAGNATION REPORT. This report
applies to F-15 engine flameout or engine shutdowns required as a result
of an engine anomaly when there is no aircraft or internal engine damage.
Report by routine message not later than 30 calendar days after the mis-
hap. Reporting units may combine more than one mishap in a single
message. When this is done, establish a separate part of the message for
each occurrence and repeat the format in each part. Prepare messages
according to figure 4-1 and the following additional instructions.
(1) Addresses. Send messages only to the following addresses (do
not use any AIG):
(a) HQ AFISC NORTON AFB CAAF /SERAF /
(b) HQ TAC LANGLEY AFB VAAF /SEAF /
(c) HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HIAF /SEAF /
(d) HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GEAF /IGFAF /
(e) HQ AFSC ANDRES AFB MDAF /IGFAF /
(f) HQ AFLC WPAFB OHAF /QA/LOA/IGYAF /
(g) ASD WPAFB OHAF /TAF/YZF/YP/YF/SEAF /
(h) NGB WASH DCAF /SEAF /
(2) Subject. Special Flight Engine Stall/Stag Report, F-15, Date,
Unit Report Number (add S/S to end of unit report number).
(3) Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Report as indicated.
(4) Items 6, 7, and 8. Not applicable.




(c) Activity. State type of maneuver being performed.
(d) Work Unit Code (WUC).
(e) How Malfunction Code (HMC).
(f) Engine Position (left or right).
(g) Engine type/designation.
(h) Engine serial number.
(i) Time since installed (TSI).
(j) Restart altitude.
(k) "G" load at time occurrence.
(1) Throttle movements prior to occurrence and position at time
of occurence.
(m) Angle of attack (AOA).
(n) Max FTIT.
(o) Remarks. Causes and corrective action. Also state whether
the engine has been modified with PLAP retard and state the EEC con-
figuration (for example IV-D-2).
(6) Items 10, 11, 12, and 13. Not applicable.
(7) Item 14b. Furnish CAT 1 MDR control numbers when
applicable.
(8) Item 15. Report as indicated.
I. SPECIAL REPORT OF MISHAPS INVOLVING HYDRAULIC FLUID.
This report applies to all USAF units converting to the less flammable
hydraulic fluid (MIL-H-83282). The purpose of this special reporting is
to determine the effectiveness of the less flammable hydraulic fluid (MIL-
H-83282). Hydraulic fluid samples will be taken immediately following a
mishap where hydraulic fluid has been determined or is suspected to be
the primary combustible fluid in the fire. A sample will also be taken on
all High Accident Potential (HAP) mishaps where the potential for hy-
draulic fluid fires exist. Identify the sample with aircraft MDS and mis-
hap control number and forward to Transportation Officer, WPAFB OH
45433, Attn: Detachment 13, SFQLA, Building 70, Area B. Detachment
13 will analyze the sample and determine the percent of mixture of MIL-
H-83282 and MIL-H-5606. Following the analysis, Det 13 will report the
results by routine message to the mishap board president or investigator
with information copies of the analyis report to:
(1) SA-ALC Kelly AFB TX/SFQT.
(2) AFWAL WPAFB OH/MLSE.
(3) HQ AFISC Norton AFB CA/SESO.
J. COMBINED MISHAP AND MATERIEL DEFICIENCY REPORTS. Mate-
riel deficiency is often identified as the only cause(s) of a Class C or HAP
flight mishap. In this case, a combined Class C or HAP mishap report
and Category I MDR may be submitted. Use the format in TO 00-35D-
54, section III. Include Class C or HAP and Cat I MDR control num-
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bers. Report using the schedule in table 4-1. If time criteria cannot be
met, submit separate reports. Add the addresses required in table 4-2 to
those required by TO 00-35D-54. Do not duplicate addresses. Safety is
responsible for preparing item 22 (the safety portion) of the combined
report. Submitting a combined report eliminates the need for a separate
mishap report message. The final MDR reply can constitute closing ac-
tion. The combined Class C or HAP mishap report and Category I MDR
is not a limited-use report, nor is it For Official Use Only.
K. REPORTING MISHAPS OF AIRCRAFT COMMON TO OTHER US MIL-
ITARY SERVICES AND THE US COAST GUARD. When flight mishap in-
volves any of the aircraft or engines in table 4-3, send the message reports
to the agencies indicated.
(1) The exchange of formal flight safety reports between the Serv-
ices is limited to the respective safety centers only.
(2) US Air Force commanders who:
(a) Need information from Army, Navy, or Coast Guard safety
reports send request to HQ AFISC/SER, Norton AFB CA 92409.
(b) Receive request from the Army, Navy, or Coast Guard for
information from Air Forse safety reports send these requests to HQ
AFISC/SER, Norton AFB CA 92409.
5-5. REPORTING MISSING AIRCRAFT. Procedures for initial message re-
porting of missing aircraft are in AFR 55-5. A missing aircraft is consid-
ered a Class A mishap when it has been missing for 10 days. If the major
effort of the search is ended earlier, the event becomes a Class A mishap at
that time. Submit a preliminary report for a Class A flight mishap. The
investigation is started as in chapter 3. Send reports on the same schedule
as for Class A flight mishap. The 30-day calendar-day time limit starts on
the date the preliminary report was sent. If the aircraft is later found,
send a supplement to the formal report. Include changes in AF Forms
711, if needed, and any other data based on the reinvestigation.
5-6. REPORTING BIRD STRIKES. Each year, aircraft collisions with birds
account for significant aircraft damage and aircrew injury. To combat
this problem, specialists at the Air Force Engineering and Services Center
(AFESC) administer the Air Force Bird Strike Hazard Reduction Pro-
gram (AFR 127-15). They develop effective bird control techniques and
work with other Air Force and civil agencies to minimize bird or aircraft
strike hazards (BASH).
A. MESSAGE REPORTS. Bird strikes which cause reportable aircraft
damage are reported according to this regulation. Using figure 4-2, in-
clude the following information in item 9 of the message:
(1) Landing lights-on or off?
(2) Strobe lights-on or off? (Or not applicable if not installed.)
(3) Phase of flight (climb, touch and go, low level, etc.)
(4) Aircraft speed. (KIAS).
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(5) Altitude (AGL and MSL).
(6) Flight path in relation to clouds (above, below, between layers).
(7) Species and number of birds.
(8) Impact point on aircraft.
(9) Was pilot warned of bird hazard?
(10) Low level route number if applicable.
(11) Did birdstrike result in fire?
(12) Geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude).
(13) Remarks.
B. BIRD IDENTIFICATION. Birdstrikes which cause reportable aircraft
damage are reported according to this regulation. Unit safety officers
should attempt to identify bird remains using competent local authorities.
When this is not possible, send the remains to HQ AFESC/DEVN,
Tyndall AFB FL 32403. Feathers are most important in the identifica-
tion process. Even downy feather remnants stuck to blood smears can
provide enough information to identify the type of bird (hawk, gull,
duck). Requests for identification should include:
(1) Organization requesting indentification.
(2) AFR 127-4 mishap control number.
(3) Date of bird strike.
(4) Type of aircraft involved in bird strike.
(5) Description of damage and cost.
(6) Geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of bird strike.
CHAPTER 12
FORMAL SAFETY REOPRTS
12-1. GENERAL INFORMATION. Formal safety reports are used to pres-
ent detailed information about mishaps. They are made up of AF Form
711 series and attached exhibits. Sometimes the details of a mishap may
be described in a one-page form without attachments. For more complex
mishaps, a whole series of forms, supported by a detailed narrative and
exhibits [are] required. The formal report is used by the Air Force to
support actions to prevent mishap recurrence. It is also used for analysis
and can lead to prevention actions that were not apparent to the field
investigator(s). AF Forms 71 la, Ground Mishap Report, are for ground
and aircraft nonflight mishaps and are explained in chapter 6. The rest of
this chapter deals with the full-scale formal report.
A. THE TwO-PART REPORT. The formal report has two parts: Part I,
Facts, and Part II, Privileged Data. AF Forms 711 are designed for two
functions. First, they show needed information for use in mishap preven-
tion. The second function is to segregate factual information which may
be disclosed outside the Air Force. In this way, the two-part report aids
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retention of privileged information and protects the privacy of medical
information. Use of the two-part format is not required when submitting
formal ground mishap reports unless the mishap is reported as an aircraft
nonflight mishap. Aircraft nonflight mishap reports require a two-part
report and the special limited use markings according to paragraph 4-
10a(2)(b). All other ground mishap reports should be completed accord-
ing to paragraph 6-8.
B. ASSEMBLING THE Two-PART REPORT. Assemble the report on
both sides of a lightweight folder (for bulky reports, use hard pressboard
folders). Use AF Forms 711 i and j for tab dividers. You may type on
both sides of the pages (head to foot, for top-edge mounting), but leave at
least 1 and 1/2 inch margin at the mounting end. Place the index tabs on
the right edge of all dividers, regardless of which side of the folder they go
on. Arrange the tabs in alphabetical order, starting at the top of the page.
Number all pages in order and by tab; for example, A-1, A-2, X-1, X-2,
and Y-2. Place part I on the right side of the folder, and part II on the
left side. If the report is so bulky that it is hard to fit both parts into one
folder, you may put each part in a separate folder. Attach the tops of the
pages to the folder with metal fasteners. Be sure to leave enough clear-
ance in the center of the folder, so you can close it easily.
c. AF FORM 711H, USAF MISHAP REPORT CHECKLIST AND INDEX.
This form is used to make sure reports are uniform and complete. Write
an X for each item in the columns "Not Applicable," "Applicable Not
Attached," or "Attached[.]" When the "Applicable Not attached" block
is checked, explain why in the "Remarks" section. Estimate the date the
missing attachment will be sent for inclusion in the report. If an attach-
ment will be sent later, insert a page with the proper lettered tab in the
report. Later, when the attachment is sent to recipients of the report, they
can put it in the report at the proper tab. Leave out tabs for those items
which are not applicable. In assembling the report, place AF Form 71 lh
on top of "tab A."
D. MARKING REPORTS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND SPECIAL HAN-
DLING. Paragraph 4-10 tells how to mark limited-use and general-use
reports.
E. AF FORM 711 SERIES. AF Form 711 series are the basic documents
for formal safety reports. Most entries in AF Forms 711 are self-explana-
tory. However, within this and subsequent chapters they are given more
explanation when needed. If reports involve more than one safety are,
include AF Forms 711 for each. For example, if a missile mishap involves
explosives, submit the missile form and the explosives form.
F. EXHIBITS. Additional documents may be used at the tabs listed on
AF Form 71 lh. Each exhibit must serve a purpose. If it is included, it
should be discussed in the analysis at tab T. Only those items which
support the investigation, analysis, findings, and recommendations are
sent with the formal report.
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12-2. WHAT TO INCLUDE IN THE TwO-PART REPORT. The following
describes the forms and other data normally needed and tells which tabs
to place them under. Sometimes the circumstances of a mishap are such
that certain normally required forms or exhibits would not add to the
report. When this is the case, AFISC will consider a request to omit them.
Requests should be submitted by message to HQ AFISC/SER.
A. PART I - FACTS:
(1) Tab A, AF From 711, USAF Mishap Report, is sent on every
full formal report. This does not apply to ground and aircraft nonflight
mishaps reported only on AF Forms 711 a (chapter 6).
(2) Tab B, AF Form 711 a, Ground Mishap Report, is used for all
ground and aircraft nonflight mishaps. If aircraft or missiles are involved,
AF From 71 la should be placed at tab T.
(3) Tab C, AF Form 71 lb, Aircraft Flight Mishap Report, is sub-
mitted on Class A, B, and C flight mishaps (including manned or un-
manned aircraft RPVs). One form is used for each aircraft involved.
(4) Tab D, AF Form 71 lc, Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Re-
port, is used for:
(a) Class A, B, and C flight mishaps (including manned or un-
manned aircraft RPVs).
(b) Class A, B, and C aircraft nonflight mishaps when mainte-
nance or materiel causes (including design deficiency) are assessed.
(5) Tab E, AF Form 71 1d, Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Re-
port, is submitted on:
(a) Class A and B missile/space systems mishaps.
(b) Class A, B, and C flight explosive, ground, or nuclear mishap
when there is significant missile involvement.
(6) Tab F, AF Form 71 le, Explosives Mishap Report, is submitted
on:
(a) Class A and B explosives mishaps.
(b) Class A, B, and C aircraft nonflight mishaps when mainte-
nance or materiel causes (including design deficiency) are assessed.
(c) Class A and B missle mishaps when explosives are involved.
(7) Tab G, Flight and Personnel Records include a copy of the
Flight Record page showing the most recent flight time. The record
should be closed out as of the date of the mishap. Include flight time in
each aircraft flown. Break down information according to aircraft
designation, inclusive dates flown, FP/IP time, and total time. (AFISC
project officers can provide this information, if requested.) Also include
training or personnel records if they relate to causes or recommendations.
(8) Tab H, AFTO Form 781 Series. Include AFTO Form 781,
Aerospace Vehicle Flight Data Document (or proper missile maintenance
form), if it adds to the report.
(9) Tab I, Materiel Deficiency Report. It is not necessary to in-
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elude copies of all Category I MDRs. Include only those which have sig-
nificant TDR results. However, provide a complete list of all the other
MDRs that are not included. Identify each MDR by date-time group,
report control number (RCN), name of part (NOM), and part number
(MFR PN).
(10) Tab J, Technical and Engineering Evaluations of Materiel
(Department of Defense). If a TDR or an engineering evaluation was
done by DOD personnel, include it here. Normally, TDRs will not be
finished in time to be put in the report by the field investigator(s). How-
ever, all available reports should be included at this tab. On-scene evalu-
ations submitted by DOD personnel (such as AFLC, AFSC, and
Directorate of Aerospace Safety) are also included at this tab. Technical
and engineering evaluations prepared by civilian contractors who design,
manufacture, or maintain equipment involved in a mishap are included
at Tab W.
(11) Tab K, DD Form 175, Military Flight Plan (or Authorized
Substitute Flight Plan Forms). Include a copy of the clearance form if it
contributes meaningful information to the report. If weather factors
played a role, also include a weather summary.
(12) Tab L, DD Form 365F, Weight and Balance Clearance Form
F. Sometimes this document helps in the analysis of the mishap. If so,
include a copy of the most recent DD Form 365F or weight and balance
computations for the flight involved. NOTE: Weight and balance calcu-
lations done by the board for its investigations are not included here.
These are part of the board's analysis and are placed in part II of the
report.
(13) Tab M, Certificate of Damage. This lists the total damage to
all Government property, materiel, and equipment. Include the mainte-
nance officer's evaluation and statement of damage. It should be detailed
and include the cost of parts replaced and the man-hours required for
repair. (See paragraph 2-5 for determining estimated and actual man-
hours for repair.)
(14) Tab N, Transcripts of Recorded Air-to-Ground/Aircraft-to-
Aircraft Communications. These are written transcripts of recorded voice
communications which bear on the analysis, findings, or recommenda-
tions. The transcript should begin early enough in the mishap sequence
for a clear understanding of preceding events. Since these transcripts are
factual data, they often provide a basis for information in the Factual
Summary of circumstances. Intra cockpit communications are privileged
and should not be referenced here but under Tab T, part II.
(15) Tab 0, Any Additional Substantiating Data Reports. This is
supporting data not otherwise defined. It includes local operating in-
structions, directives, approach and landing charts, flight data recorder
data, and other forms.
(16) Tab P, Statement of Damage to Private Property. If private
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property was damaged in the mishap, describe the damage at this tab. If
the claims officer's damage statement is not yet available, the investigat-
ing officer includes his or her own statement of estimated damages.
(17) Tab Q Orders Appointing Investigating Board. Include one
copy of the orders appointing the board (or officer).
(18) Tab R, Diagrams (fallout, impact area, and so forth). Dia-
grams should be self-explanatory, indicating wreckage patterns, angle of
impact, or association with structures, facilities, and so forth.
(19) Tab S, Photographs. Well defined 8X10 glossy photographs
can help in analyzing the mishap. These are generally used to show dam-
age, angles of impact, metal fractures, flight path, or vehicle travel. In
some cases color photography is good for analysis, but do not use color if
black and white will serve. Motion picture films and videotape are also a
good source of information. These should be sent to the Directorate of
Aerospace Safety as part of the report. Do not include photographs of
deceased personnel in the mishap report. Pages on which photographs
are placed are numbers (S-1, S-2, and so forth). Do not mark the photo-
graphs themselves. Place an index of photographs at tab S to aid review-
ers. Neither the page captions nor comments in the index may refer to
privileged information. Staged photographs that are part of the board's
analysis are included at tab T near the related narrative. (Example: Pic-
tures of models showing flight paths in a midair collision.) If it is impossi-
ble to describe a point of interest on a photograph in the caption, use
circles or arrows on a transparent overlay. Only include photographs
which aid in understanding the mishap and which are referred to in the
analysis at tab T. However, all photographs taken by the board, except
those staged for analysis, are held for use in the accident investigation.
B. PART II-BOARD OR INVESTIGATOR ANALYSIS:
(1) Tab T, Investigation, Analysis, Findings, and Recommenda-
tions. This is the most important part of the report. It draws on all por-
tions of the report to provide a complete picture of what happened. This
is followed by thorough analysis of all evidence, then findings, causes, and
recommendations. This section records the opinions of the board. It
should accept or reject all evidence in the report. Only in the case of a
formal minority report should there be differing findings, causes, or rec-
ommendations. Chapter 3 deals with this portion of the report in more
detail. (NOTE: For aircraft nonflight mishaps, place AF Form 71 la at
this tab.)
(2) Tab U, Statements and Testimony of Witnesses and Persons In-
volved. Statements should be taken from all individuals concerned with
the mishap or who were eyewitnesses to it. (The locally reproduced state-
ment format in figure 12-1 is used in formal limited-use reports.) If more
than one statement is obtained from an individual, all should be included
at this tab. The board may select for inclusion those statements and testi-
mony that are meaningful. It is not always necessary to include all state-
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ments. However, a complete list of all witnesses contacted is provided to
the accident investigation. When an individual gives further testimony
before the Board, that also is included at this tab. The statements and
testimony of each individual are placed together in chronological order
with the earliest on top. Their proximity makes it easier to compare the
individual's impressions. All statements and testimony included at this
tab must be considered in the analysis at tab T.
(3) Tab V, Rebuttals. When an Air Force individual is cited as
causal in a mishap, he or she may rebut the conclusion. The individual
submits either a statement of rebuttal or a statement declining rebuttal
(figure 12-2). Refer to paragraph 12-13 for details. This does not apply to
ground or explosives mishaps, unless they involve Air Force aircraft, mis-
siles, or space systems.
(4) Tab W, Technical and Engineering Evaluations of Materiel
(Contractors). Engineering evaluations.
(5) Tab X, AF Form 711 f, Nuclear Accident/Incident Report, is
submitted on:
(a) Nuclear accidents and incidents.
(b) Flight and missile mishaps in which nuclear material is also
involved.
(6) Tab Y, AF Form 71 lgA and B, Life Sciences Report of an Indi-
vidual Involved in an Air Force Accident/Incident. Submit these forms
as explained in chapter 11.
(7) Tab Z, Board Proceedings. Use of this tab is optional. Investi-
gation boards may use this tab to tell reviewing agencies about investiga-
tion problems and to make recommendations for improving reporting
and investigating procedures. Comments on technical assistance which
was coordinated through AFISC are also appropriate.
12-3. PREPARING AF FORM 711, USAF MISHAP REPORT. Fill out AF
Form 711 on each flight, missile, space, nuclear, and explosives mishap
requiring a full formal report. The form is placed in part I of the report
at tab A. In most cases, the instructions on the form explain the required
entries. The following instructions are for filling in blocks for which the
instructions are not fully self-explanatory:
A. ITEM 2. Vehicle(s) or Materiel Involved. List the aircraft, missile,
space system, nuclear weapon or system, automotive vehicle, ground
equipment, explosives items, or any other item involved. Give model
designation and serial number of aircraft, missile, or other item when it
can be so identified. For an automotive vehicle, list type (PMV or
GMV), make (Ford, Buick), and body style (2-door sedan, 1/2-ton pickup
truck). If the report is on injuries only and no equipment is involved,
enter "NA" in this block. If more than one vehicle or item of equipment
is involved, list the one mainly responsible first, followed by the others.
B. ITEM 3. For Ground Accidents Only. Do not fill in. This item
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pertains to ground mishaps. The AF Form 711 is no longer used for
ground mishaps.
C. ITEM 4. Place of Occurrence, Distance and Direction From Near-
est Town or nearest military airfield. Give distances in miles (indicate
nautical mile(NM) or statute mile (SM), using points of the compass for
directionD]. Also, give geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude).
Give the location of the mishap and not the location where trouble first
developed. For an on-base mishap, give the exact location (for example,
bldg T-465, Aircraft Hanger, Luke AFB AZ).
D. ITEM 6. Day, Night Dawn, Dusk. Using the Air Almanac, con-
sider dusk as beginning with official sunset and lasting 30 minutes. Dawn
begins 30 minutes before sunrise and lasts until sunrise.
E. ITEM 7. Organization Possessing or Owning Vehicle or Materiel at
Time of Mishap. Aircraft and missiles are possessed by the organizations
which report them on the pertinent Air Force aircraft or missile report.
In transferring aircraft and missiles, possession takes place as stated in
paragraph 1-3.
(1) Enter the base at which the involved aircraft or missile is sta-
tioned. In addition to the name of the base, list the installation and loca-
tion code as given in AFR 300-4, Vol III.
(2) Sometimes the structure of the organization possessing the
equipment is not the same as the headings of the boxes in item 7. In this
case, substitute proper units and organization.
(3) For ANG units which have been federalized, show the gaining
command, subcommand, or numbered air force. Also show the applica-
ble ANG air division, wing, group, and squadron. For ANG units which
are not federalized, show the ANG organizations and indicate ANG as
the major command.
F. ITEM 8. (List of organizations of second vehicle, if they differ from
item 7 above.) More than one vehicle or item of equipment may be in-
volved. If the organization possessing the second vehicle is different from
item 7, list it here. This item is also used if an aircraft is possessed by one
organization but the flying hours are reported by another. In this case,
cross out the parenthetic note in this item.
[THE REGULATION DOES NOT HAVE AN ITEM 9. EDS.]
G. ITEM 10. List of Personnel Directly Involved. List the information
for each military person or civilian employee in the Federal Service in-
volved in the mishap. Also include all persons injured on the ground as a
result of the mishap. List the operator or person most directly involved
first. Army and Navy personnel assigned to the Air Force are shown as
Army or Navy. Identify civilian employees by their employment agency
or department (for example, Civ-USAF, Civ-Army, Civ-FAA, and so
forth). For missile mishaps, list only those persons directly connected with
the mishap, such as project director, guidance technician, or mission
controller.
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(1) Assigned Duty. Use abbreviation of duty title. For
crewmembers in flight mishaps use the duty symbol shown on AFTO
Form 781.
(2) Aero Rating. Use abbreviations as in AFR 35-13.
(3) Days Lost on TT Only. Refer to paragraph 2-1f(3) for defini-
tion of lost workday. If lost workdays will continue after the report is sent
in, use an estimate of the total.
H. ITEM 11. Factual Summary of Circumstances. This summary of
the mishap may be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act.
Therefore, there are two main considerations for completing this item.
First, the summary should be completely factual. It should not draw on
privileged sources. These sources include witness statements; technical
evaluations by contractors; and the board's investigation, analysis, conclu-
sions, findings, and recommendations. Also, avoid drawing on any infor-
mation in part II of the report which is not also shown in the exhibits in
part I. The second consideration is that the Factual Summary of Circum-
stances must lead the reader through the sequence of events involved in
the mishap. Meeting both these goals is sometimes a difficult task. The
following guidance will assist investigators in completing this item:
(1) The Factual Summary of Circumstances is presented in se-
quence. Start with the earliest related point and continue until the time
of the occurrence.
(2) The reader should be able to form a general picture of the mis-
hap without reference to the attachments. The facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstances are recorded just as they were discovered by the investigators.
(3) The reader should know how the mishap occurred, not why it
happened. The importance of facts, or how they relate to investigative
conclusions, should not be discussed.
(4) Factual evidence is taken from exhibits in part I of the report.
Do not refer to imformation in part II.
(5) Writing style is important. Many requests under the Freedom
of Information Act are made for an account of the mishap, but not for the
report itself. In these cases, only the Factual Summary of Circumstances
is released. Therefore, as complete a factual summary as possible should
be provided.
(6) In rare cases, there is not enough factual information available
for an understandable summary. When this is the case, certain informa-
tion given by witnesses may add to the narrative without implying inves-
tigative conclusions. If it is absolutely necessary to use this information,
the following instructions apply:
(a) Style the narrative so that the information is not attributed to
any individual.
(b) Advise the witness whose statement provided the information
and allow the individual to review the summary and approve its release.
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Attach a signed statement approving the release to the letter of transmit-
tal to the Directorate of Aerospace Safety.
12-4. PREPARING AF FORM 71 1A GROUND MISHAP REPORT. See
Chapter 6.
12-5. PREPARING AF FORM 711 B, AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT.
Most of the items in the form are self-explanatory. Remember that this
form is placed in part I of the report. Do not include information learned
solely from confidential sources (witness statements or inputs from con-
tractors). Only include information which can be supported by other fac-
tual data in part I. The following paragraphs tell how to fill out parts of
the form that are not self-explanatory:
A. ITEM 1. Mishap Class. Mark the appropriate mishap class. If the
aircraft is destroyed, mark both "A" and "DEST."
B. ITEM 2. Aircraft MDS and Serial Number. Give complete infor-
mation on mission, design, and series (MDS), as well as block number and
prefixes if they apply.
C. ITEM 3. Date. Enter the date of the mishap. Use six digits to ex-
press the year, month, and day (76-01-14). If the exact date of the mishap
must be estimated, indicate by writing "(EST)" after the date.
D. ITEM 4. Unit Control Number. This is the unit report number
required in paragraph 4-7b(l)(e). Example: 25 FTW-1.
E. ITEM 6. Operator at controls:
(1) The operator means the pilot who was at the controls at the
time the mishap occurred.
(2) Component is one of the following:
(a) Reg AF. Member of the regular Air Force.
(b) AFRES. Member of the US Air Force Reserve while in the
active military service.
(c) ANGUS[.] Member of the Air National Guard of the US
while in active military service.
(d) RIN. Member of the US Air Force Reserve not on active
duty (including inactive personnel on temporary training duty).
(e) ANG. Member of the Air National Guard of the US while
not in active military service.
(f) RAF, USN, civ, and so forth, as applicable.
(3) Pilots may be assigned to one organization for duty, but at-
tached to another for flying. If so, fill out the blocks for both "assigned
organization" and "attached organization for flying."
F. ITEM 10. Clearance From - To:-. State the place where the
fight originated, and the destination to which it was cleared. Also indi-
cate the type of clearance (there may be more than one type; example:
VFR and LOCAL, or IFR and AIRWAYS).
G. ITEM 12. Type of Mission. Use the mission symbol for the mishap
flight, as given on AFTO Form 781.
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H. ITEM 13. Altitude/Elevation. This is the altitude or elevation
where the mishap happened. Express flight altitude as MSL or FL. Also
indicate altitude above ground level (AGL). If the mishap occurred as a
result of collision with the ground (excluding collisions preceded by stalls,
spins, spirals, explosions, or airframe failures), indicate terrain elevation.
I. ITEM 14. Phase of Operation. Select only one of the following
phases of operation:






(b) Initial climb (within 5 miles of airport).
(c) Discontinued (including all attempts to stop the takeoff run




(b) Acrobatics (including intentional maneuvers resulting in ab-
rupt changes in speed, direction, or altiutude).
(c) Climb (to cruise altitude, change of altitude, and so forth).
(d) Refueling.
(e) Air-to-ground gunnery, rocketry, or bombing.
(f) Air-to-air gunnery or rocketry.
(g) Low-level flight (prolonged, according to directed mission re-
quirements; this does not mean "buzzing" or confirmed violations of AFR
60-16).
(h) Descent (prolonged, such as jet penetration, letdown, and so
forth).
(i) Aerial delivery of personnel or equipment.
() Other.
(5) Landing:
(a) Approach (all legs in landing pattern, GCA and ILS
included).
(b) Flare and touchdown.
(c) Roll (ends when pilot adds power for touch-and-go or go-
around, or when the aircraft slows to taxi speed to turn off the runway).
(d) Other.
(6) Go-around (ends when power can be reduced and the aircraft
can maneuver freely):
(a) Premeditated (including touch-and-go).
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(b) Unpremeditated (originally intended to make full-stop
landing).




J. ITEM 15. Type of mishap. Types of mishaps are:
(1) Hard Landing. Stalling in or flying into runway or other in-
tended landing space while landing.
(2) Collapse or Retraction of Landing Gear. All of these occur on
the ground, except those cases defined as wheels-up landings.
(3) Undershoot. Landing short of runway or other intended land-
ing space.
(4) Overshot. Landing too fast or too far down the runway.
(5) Collision With Other Aircraft.
(6) Collision With Ground or Water. Excludes collisions preceded
by stalls, spins, spirals, explosions, or airframe failures.
(7) Other Collisions. Collisions with any objects other than
ground, water, or other aircraft; excludes collisions preceded by stalls,
spins, spirals, explosions, or airframe failures.
(8) Spin or Stall. Includes all mishaps where the aircraft spins or
stalls into the ground or water; excludes hard landings, stalls that occur
above the landing space while leveling off, airframe failures, midair colli-
sions, and explosions.
(9) Fire or Explosion on Ground. All mishaps resulting from fire or
explosion on the ground.
(10) Fire or Explosion in Flight. All mishaps resulting from fire or
explosion in the air.
(11) Airframe Failure. All mishaps resulting from failure of any
part of the airframe, such as wing spars, empennage, hinges, and fuselage
skin, even though the aircraft lands safely without further damage. This
also includes inflight equipment losses that are not caused by the action or
inaction of personnel.
(12) Abandoned Aircraft. All personnel capable of piloting an air-
craft abandon it in flight; excludes spins or stalls, fire or explosion in the
air, airframe failure, and collisions.
(13) Propeller or Jet Blast. Injury or property damage resulting
from contact with propellers or from propeller or jet blast.
(14) Equipment Loss in Flight. Mishaps where aircraft equipment,
such as canopies, hatches, or tip tanks, are jettisoned or detached from the
aircraft. This is limited to jettisons caused by the actions of persons in the
aircraft or by maintenance malpractice, whether intentional or not.
K. ITEM 17. Airfield Data. "Distance of touchdown from runway"
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means distance from the approach end of the runway to the first touch-
down point.
12-6. PREPARING AF FORM 71 1c, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MA-
TERIEL REPORT. This form is self-explanatory. Refer to paragraph 2-5 in
determining man-hour and cost entries.
12-7. PREPARING AF FORM 711D, MISSILE OR SPACE VEHICLE MISHAP
REPORT. See chapter 7 or chapter 9 respectively.
12-8. PREPARING AF FORM 71lE, EXPLOSIVE MISHAP REPORT. See
chapter 8.
12-9. PREPARING AF FORM 71 IF, NUCLEAR ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RE-
PORT. See chapter 10.
12-10. PREPARING AF FORM 711GA, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT. See
chapter 11.
12-11. PREPARING AF FORM 711GB, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT, ON NU-
CLEAR ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS. See chapter 10.
12-12. WRITING THE NARRATIVE REPORT. This section is designed to
help in writing the narrative portion (part II, tab T) of a formal report.
These principles also apply to final progress message reports. The Factual
Summary of Circumstances (part I, tab A) explains how the mishap oc-
curred. The narrative explains why it happened.
A. CONTENTS OF THE NARRATIVE REPORT. The narrative has three
major topics: Investigation/Analysis, Findings, and Recommendations.
The investigator may inlcude a fourth major topic, History of Flight, if
the Factual Summary or Circumstances in part I needs amplifying. The
narrative must clearly show the scope of the investigation (what evidence
was examined?) and analyze the evidence presented (what conclusions
did the evidence lead to, and why?). The narrative points out which evi-
dence is most worthy of belief. It also explains why certain possibilities
are eliminated, while others are retained.
B. IDENTIFYING INVOLVED PERSONNEL. In general, the narrative
should not identify involved personnel by name or call sign. Instead, use
such devices as "the mishap aircraft," "the flight leader," "vehicle
number I," or "the crane operator."
c. REFERRING TO EXHIBITS. When the report includes supporting
documents, the narrative should refer to the tabs and page numbers of the
exhibits. Supporting documents include records, photos, statements,
technical reports, and the like. This permits merely summarizing the evi-
dence in the narrative. It eliminates the need to repeat material word for
word from other parts of the report.
D. FINDINGS, CAUSES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. The most impor-
tant part of mishap investigation is developing findings, causes, and rec-
ommendations. The goal is to decide on the best preventive actions to
preclude mishap recurrence. To accomplish this purpose, the investiga-
tor(s) must list the significant events and circumstances of the mishap se-
quence (findings). Then they must select from among these the events
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and conditions that were causal (causes). Finally, they suggest courses of
action to prevent recurrence (recommendations).
12-13. NOTIFYING PERSONS FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR AN AIRCRAFT,
MISSILE, OR NUCLEAR MISHAP. Use the following procedures for formal
reports, for message reports see paragraph 12-13b:
a. Military and Civilian Personnel Under Air Force Jurisdiction.
When an Air Force person is named as a cause of one of these mishaps, he
or she should have a chance to rebut the report. This applies to all re-
ports, indorsement by reviewing commanders, and the HQ USAF/IGD
letter of final evaluation. Ask the involved individual to submit a state-
ment of rebuttal or a statement declining rebuttal. (See figure 12-2 for
suggested format.) The person must be advised that paragraph 3-5d ap-
plies to the statement of rebuttal and that the statement becomes an at-
tachment to the mishap report. If the person found responsible is:
(1) Attached or assigned to the organization that had the mishap,
the investigator(s) offers the person a chance to submit a rebuttal state-
ment. Convening authorities forward rebuttal statements to all report ad-
dresses within 30 days of completion of the formal report if the statements
were not included in the basis report. The command review process, in-
cluding the HQ USAF/IGD letter of final evaluation, will not be delayed
for rebuttals that are not received within 30 days.
(2) Attached or assigned to another major command, the investiga-
tor(s) sends a copy of the report to the person's immediate commander.
Attach a letter asking that commander to:
(a) Notify and give the person a chance to review the report.
(b) Get the rebuttal statement and send it to the convening au-
thority for the investigation.
(c) Send one copy of the rebuttal statement with the report
through channels to the major commander. The major commander de-
taches the report and indorses the rebuttal statement to the Director of
Aerospace Safety or Nuclear Surety. State any additional preventive ac-
tion which has been taken.
(3) Named as a cause during the review process, the investigating
major commander makes sure the member is informed of this action using
procedures in (2) above.
(4) Physically or mentally incapacitated at the time of investiga-
tion, the commander notifies the individuals as soon as possible. Make
sure the person has the chance to review and submit the rebuttal
statement.
b. Persons found causal in mishaps reported by message have an op-
portunity to rebut the report. They do this by reviewing the report and
writing a letter of rebuttal to their commander within 30 days. The com-
mander considers the information presented in the rebuttal and, if war-
ranted, issues a supplemental report.
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c. Non-Air Force Military Personnel and Civilians Outside Air Force
Jurisdiction. The investigator(s) does not offer non-Air Force personnel
the chance to review the report and submit a rebuttal statement.
12-14. OTHER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE.
Findings developed during the investigation, but which are not a part of
the mishap sequence, should not be included. They should be attached to
the letter of transmittal forwarding the report to the convening authority.
A copy may also be attached to the letter of transmittal of the report
routed through command channels for review. These nonrelated findings
may cover a wide variety of subjects. Their use, content, and format are
left to the board president. These findings are not part of the mishap
report. Recommendations which are not related to the causes of the mis-
hap or the fatal/major/minor injuires are included in this letter. Any
needed action must be taken by separate correspondence from the con-
vening or other command authority.
12-15. MINORITY REPORTS. When one or more board members dis-
agrees with the board president's findings or recommendations, they sub-
mit a minority report. The minority report should state the reason(s) for
disagreeing with the majority and must include the minority findings and
causes. Recommendations, if different than those contained in the major-
ity report, are also listed. All dissenting members sign the minority report.
It is placed in the report immediately after the authentication page. List
minority reports in the "Remarks" section of AF Form 71 1h. The find-
ings and causes of the board president are the majority findings of the
board, regardless of the numerical majority. Findings and causes which
differ from those of the board president, therefore, are always the "minor-
ity report."
12-16. AUTHENTICATION. Type each voting board member's name,
grade, and position on the last page of this section. Have each applicable
person sign above it for authentication of the report. For those mishaps
investigated and reported by a single investigating officer, only name,
grade, and signature need appear.
12-17. FORWARDING FORMAL REPORTS. Send the report to the ad-
dressees listed in tables 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, or 12-5 within the assigned
deadline.
A. HOW TO FORWARD THE REPORT:
(1) Send one copy of an aircraft, missile, space, or explosives safety
report to the Director of Aerospace Safety. Send nuclear mishap reports
to the Director of Nuclear Surety. Use a letter of transmittal to forward
the report.
(2) Send one copy (original if carbons are used) of Class A and B
on-duty ground mishap reports to the Director of Aerospace Safety. Use
a letter of transmittal to forward the report.
(3) Send one copy (original if carbons are used) of a off-duty
ground mishap report (AF Form 71 1a) through the major command to
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the Director of Aerospace Safety. A transmittal letter is not required.
Use the same procedure for the Class C on-duty ground and aircraft non-
flight mishap reports (AF Forms 71 la and 711b). Commands may sup-
plement this regulation to allow these reports to be sent through
numbered air forces. However, the deadline to the Director of Aerospace
Safety is 30 days from the time of the mishap.
B. LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL:
(1) The letters of transmittal must list all addressees receiving cop-
ies of (or extracts or attachments from) the report. All copies of limited-
use reports are numbered and accounted for through distribution. Do this
by listing in the "TO" element of the letter of transmittal, each addressee
to include office symbol by copy number. Example: HQ MAC/IGF
Scott AFB IL, copy 1 of 20.
(2) The last paragraph of the letter of transmittal, signed by the
board president, will contain a statement certifying that the number of
copies listed are the only copies of the report produced by the safety
board.
C. LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION OF A LIMITED-USE REPORT. A
limited-use report is distributed within the Air Force on a "need to know"
basis. Providing copies or extracts to agencies outside the Air Force is
prohibited. Distribution within the Air Force is as shown in tables 12-1,
12-2, 12-3, 12-4, and 12-5. Do not produce extra copies except in the
following circumstances:
(1) Major commands may require additional copies to be sent to
command headquarters to aid in staffing the report. After the command
indorsement has been sent, all but the file must be destroyed.
(2) In certain cases, action may be required of an Air Force agency
which is not shown in the distribution tables. All agencies or organiza-
tions tasked in the recommendations must receive copies of the formal
report. Coordinate this requirement with HQ AFISC/SEP by message or
telephone (AUTOVON 876-2244) prior to forwarding any additional
copy. (See paragraph 13-6b.)
(3) If an Air Staff office is the action agency for a validated recom-
mendation, AFISC prepares the required correspondence. (See para-
graph 13-6b.)
(4) Extra copies of reports may be required by paragraph 3-2 or
requested by the Director of Aerospace Safety or Nuclear Surety. These
are sent to those directors, who will then provide them to the proper
agency(s). (See paragraph 13-6b.)
(5) Producing informational only copies of formal reports is
prohibited.
(6) The board president may retain a complete copy of the formal
report (for briefing purposes) for 60 days. This copy will be listed on the
letter of transmittal and returned to the MAJCOM safety office for
disposition.
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APPENDIX "B"
AIR FORCE REGULATION 110-14
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILE ACCIDENTS
1. TERMS EXPLAINED:
A. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. An officer's or board's investigation of
an aircraft or missile accident conducted under this regulation.
B. ACCIDENT REPORT. A record containing evidence gathered by an
accident investigation conducted under this regulation. The formal title
is "Aircraft (or Missile) Accident Investigation Report."
C. SAFETY MISHAP INVESTIGATION. An officer's or board's investiga-
tion of an aircraft, missile, nuclear, or space mishap conducted under
AFR 127-4.
D. SAFETY MISHAP REPORT. A record containing findings, conclu-
sions, and evidence gathered by an aircraft, missile, nuclear, or space
safety investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. The formal title is
"USAF Safety Mishap Report."
2. POLICY ON AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS:
a. The Air Force investigates these accidents primarily to:
(1) Find out their probable and contributing causes for accident
prevention.
(2) Obtain and preserve available evidence for claims, litigation,
disciplinary and administrative actions, and for all other purposes.
b. The Air Force meets these goals by doing two separate investiga-
tions of the same accident:
(1) Safety Mishap Investigation. The sole purpose of this investiga-
tion is mishap prevention. Its success depends on candid statements and
observations of personnel involved in the mishap. To obtain full disclo-
sure, safety investigators promise witnesses their testimony will be used
only for mishap prevention. This promise of confidentiality enables safety
investigators to learn what witnesses know about the mishap even though
their testimony may be incriminating or against their personal interests.
(a) The Air Force asserts governmental privilege to protect the
following information from release outside command and safety channels:
witness testimony and inputs from contractors received under a promise
of confidentiality; the safety investigators' opinions, deliberations, and
communications; life science reports; and other non-factual portions of
Part II of the safety mishap report.
(b) The Air Force does not assert the privilege to protect factual
information in Part I of the safety mishap report.
(2) Accident Investigation. This investigation is not intended to
determine cause; rather it serves claims, litigation, disciplinary, and ad-
ministrative needs. For these reasons a thorough accident investgation
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and quality accident report are important ot the Air Force mission. An
accident report is not privileged and is releasable to anyone upon request
and payment of applicable fees.
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SAFETY MISHAP INVESTIGATION AND AN
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION:
a. These investigations are conduced completely apart from each
other. A safety investigation takes priority over the accident investigation
in interviewing witnesses, obtaining and analyzing evidence, and inspect-
ing the scene of the accident. An accident investigation is conducted at
the same time only if it does not interfere with the safety investigation.
For these reasons do not:
(1) Assign members of the safety investigation board to participate
in an accident investigation of the same mishap.
(2) Permit accident investigators to attend the safety investigation
proceedings.
(3) Appoint officers currently assigned and performing safety duties
to conduct an accident investigation. They may, as witnesses, provide
non-privileged information to accident investigators but cannot help con-
duct such an investigation.
(4) Allow accident investigators to review, use, or compare in whole
or in part the written or recorded testimony given to safety investigators.
(5) Permit witnesses who appeared before safety investigators to:
(a) Reveal their testimony, opinions, analyses, speculations, or
recommendations given to the safety investigators. Witnesses may pro-
vide the same factual information in both investigations so long as the
accident investigators obtain the information through independent ques-
tioning and not be asking witnesses to tell them what they told the safety
investigators.
(b) Disclose testimony, findings, recommendations, or cause fac-
tors included in the safety report.
NOTE: These restrictions apply to any person with access to privileged
safety material who may be called as a witness before any other proceed-
ing, civilian or military.
b. Inform all winesses in an accident investigation of its nature and of
the possible use of their testimony in adverse actions, litigation, and
claims. Ensure they are fully aware of the difference between the two
investigations. See attachment 3 for sample advice.
4. WHO Is RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION:
a. The major command (MAJCOM) commander or signee who con-
venes the safety investigation under AFR 127-4.
(1) Convenes an accident invesigation and directs when it is to
begin.
(2) Ascertains whether the investigation meets the requirements of
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all commands or components concerned when aircraft or personnel form
more than one MAJCOM or component of the Air Force are involved.
(3) Contacts the other military service or services when personnel
or aircraft from two or more are involved, and determines if a joint inves-
tigation is feasible.
(4) Requests, if desired, a MAJCOM commander with a unit
nearer the location of the accident to direct an accident investigation.
(5) Provides a copy of the completed and approved report to the
Chief, National Guard Bureau, in cases involving ANG aircraft or
personnel.
b. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, state adjutant general con-
cerned, or their designees:
(1) Convene the accident investigation when the accident involves
ANG aircraft, except when aircraft from another Air Force component
also are involved.
(2) Ensure the accident investigation is conducted according to this
regulation.
(3) Provide a copy of the completed and approved accident report
to the gaining MAJCOM.
5. WHEN To CONDUCT AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. An accident in-
vestigations is:
a. Required when it is reasonably clear from the circumstances in-
vovled that:
(1) Claims against the US Government will exceed $50,000;
(2) Litigation against the US or any third party, including present
and former government contractors, is anticipated; or
(3) The accident has caused or is likely to cause a fatal or perma-
nently disabling injury to any person.
b. Discretionary when the convening authority desires it.
6. How To CONDUCT AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. A board of three
or more officers or single officer may conduct the investigation.
a. Use paragraph 8 of this regulation and the guidelines of AFR 120-
4.
b. Prepare reports according to attachment 5.
7. WHO CONDUCTS AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. Accident investiga-
tors must be from an organization other than the one to which the air-
craft, missile, or crew members are assigned. Appoint only experienced,
qualified officers, preferably senior in grade to persons who may be sub-
ject to disciplinary actions or adverse administrative proceedings. They
normally should possess the following qualifications:
A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS - a rated officer who is or has been recently
qualified in the aircraft involved.
B. MISSILE ACCIDENTS - an experienced missile officer who has
knowledge or experience in the missile system involved.
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C. BOARD OF OFFICERS - at least one member with the qualifications
of a or b above, and another with recent operations or maintenance
experience.
8. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES:
a. Accident investigators:
(1) Follow the checklist in attachment 1.
(2) Obtain relevant documentary evidence, including autopsy pro-
tocols, X-rays and toxicology reports, if applicable (attachment 1). Acci-
dent investigators must obtain all material, regardless of its apparent
triviality or redundancy, and review it for possible inclusion in the acci-
dent report.
(3) Prepare a factual summary but do not make conclusions or rec-
ommendations (attachement 5).
b. Presidents of safety investigation boards:
(1) provide accident investigators with:
(a) All nonprivileged material gathered by the safety investiga-
tors including, but not limited to, the information in Part I of the safety
report.
(b) A list of all witnesses who testified or provided statements to
the safety investigators.
(c) Negatives or copies of all nonprivileged photographs, aircraft
vidocassette recordings, and medical and personnel records.
(d) Notification of when the wreckage is released to them.
(2) Do not release:
(a) Witness statements or testimony provided to safety
investigators.
(b) Data, reports, or studies manufacturers provided to the safety
investigators under a promise of confidentiality.
(c) Safety investigation proceedings, findings, conclusions, opin-
ions, or recommendations.
(d) Life Sciences Reports.
(e) Cockpit Voice Recordings.
c. Accident investigation witnesses:
(1) May not testify in accident investigations until they have been
released by the safety investigators.
(2) Are interviewed as soon as they are released by the safety
investigators.
(3) Are advised of their rights against self-incrimination if sus-
pected of a criminal offense (attachment 3).
(4) Must appear when called and testify under oath or affirmation
if they are members or employees of the US Air Force, unless they assert
the privilege against self-incrimination.
d. Commanders make technical advisors available to accident investi-
19841
902 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
gators (for example, maintenance, personnel, medical, legal, etc.). Advi-
sors perform duties as directed by investigators and need not be appointed
on orders.
9. PREPARING AND DISTRIBUTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
REPORTS:
a. The investigating officer or board:
(1) Completes accident reports within 30 days from the date the
accident investigation is begun, unless the appointing authority grants an
extension for good cause.
(2) Prepares a summary of facts.
(3) Compiles and assembles the report on letter size paper as out-
lined in attachment 2.
(4) Includes the originals of all documents related to the accident,
including relevant historical maintenance records of the aircraft or missile
involved, except when:
(a) The originating agency retains them, such as personnel for
flight records. In these cases use certified copies and state in the report
why the originals are not included.
(b) The Air Force Communications Command custodian secures
and retains originals of tape recordings of air traffic control or other radio
communications according to AFR 60-5. Include a certified transcript of
any such communications in the accident report.
(5) Sends all copies of the report and all evidence not included in
the report to the supporting staff judge advocate (SJA).
b. The Supporting SJA:
(1) Reviews the report for legal sufficiency.
(2) Sends the original and three copies of the report and legal re-
view to appointing authority's SJA.
c. The SJA, at the direction of appointing authority:
(1) Upon receipt of the report:
(a) Coordinates it with appropriate staff agencies (for example,
Director of Operations and Director of Maintenance).
(b) Reviews if for legal sufficiency.
(c) Submits it and staff comments to the appointing authority.
(Do not incorporate staff comments into the accident report).
(2) After the appointing authority's review and action:
(a) Retains the original report.
(b) Sends one copy of the report to any MAJCOM involved.
(c) Sends two copies of the report to the responsible claims officer
if claims are anticipated.
(d) Sends one copy of the summary of facts only to HQ
USAF/JACC.
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d. The appointing authority reviews the report and determines the
appropriate action.
e. This accident investigation report is exempt from report control
procedures under the provisions of AFR 178-7, paragraph 1-7a(4).
10. DISPOSITION OF WRECKAGE AND OTHER EVIDENTIARY MATERI-
ALS. The supporting SJA:
a. Ensures the wreckage is retained and preserved as required and co-
ordinates with the appointing authority's SJA and HQ USAF/JACC
before releasing it for disposal.
b. Coordinates requests for disposal of wreckage by letter, message, or
telephone and includes the following information:
(1) Date and time of accident.
(2) Type of aircraft or missile involved.
(3) Location of accident.
(4) Details and status of persons killed or injured.
(5) Short factual summary of the accident, including a list of any
parts that may be relevant to claims and litigation.
(6) Estimate of the number and types of claims anticipated.
c. Disposes of evidence not included in the report after the appointing
authority approves the report unless:
(1) There is litigation (contact HQ USAF/JACC to determine if
this applies).
(2) Source agency requires its return.
(3) Other directives require its retention.
d. Indexes and retains the evidence not included in the report if there
is litigation until it is completed; ensures evidence does not contain privi-
leged safety information; and sends a copy of the index to the appointing
authority's SJA.
11. RELEASE OF RECORDS. The disclosure authority for accident re-
ports is the MAJCOM SJA or designee. The disclosure authority for
ANG accident reports is the Chief, National Guard Bureau or designee.
Process requests for copies of the report as follows:
a. Provide copies free of charge to family members of individuals
killed in the accident.
b. Apply the fees specified in AFR 12-30 for requests made under the
Freedom of Information Act.
c. Apply the fees specified in AFR 12-32 for all other requests.

Comments

